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Climate change has, of late, been receiving more
media attention than ever before. This is partially a
result of the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol
despite US and Australian government intransigence,
as well as UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s championing
of the issue while serving as chair of the 2005
meeting of the G8 in Scotland. In parallel to these
political processes, the world is slowly waking up to
the magnitude of the threat posed by climate change
as the world’s leading scientists warn of the dangers
of complacency. Concerns over climate change
impacts such as droughts, floods, rising sea-levels,
food insecurity, loss of biodiversity and depleted
fresh water supplies have created a broad social
consensus that climate change is one of the single
greatest threats humankind faces. According to the
World Health Organisation, climate change is already
responsible for some 160,000 deaths annually.1 
The science is clear. A study by the International
Climate Change Taskforce found that with any
increase above two degrees in global mean
temperature, “the risks to human societies and
ecosystems grow significantly,” with an increased
possibility of  “abrupt, accelerated, or runaway
climate change.” According to the high-level group -
co-chaired by British Labour MP Stephen Byers and
US Republican Senator Olympia Snowe - this scenario
could be avoided by keeping the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere below 400 parts
per million (ppm). However they warn that current
concentrations of 379 ppm “are likely to rise above
400 ppm in coming decades and could rise far higher
under a business-as-usual scenario.”2
This briefing examines how despite the urgent need
for action, the G8 nations are locked into this
‘business-as-usual’ scenario through their
perpetuation and reinforcement of the kind of fossil-
fuelled economic expansion that has given rise to
climate change in the first place. As the grouping of
nations most responsible for the majority of historic
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as simultaneously
being the most powerful industrialised nations, the
G8 is a logical frame of reference from which to
analyse the political economy of climate change. 
However this focus is somewhat arbitrary. Firstly, the
nature of economic globalisation demands a more
complex reading of the relationship between nation-
states and transnational corporations. These
corporations are in no way restricted to the G8
countries, either in economic and industrial activity
or in terms of influence over national and
international policy. Secondly, the G8 is only one
particular grouping of rich nations, and although
arguably the most powerful and influential, it is not
unique. Institutions such as the World Economic
Forum (WEF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) also exist to
foster political and economic consensus amongst
richer nations, and thus also have an impact on
climate change through their mutual reinforcement
of neoliberal economic policies and frameworks. The
focus on the G8 countries in this briefing is intended
to serve as a useful window into the interaction of
neoliberal policy and climate change rather than
telling the whole story.
offsetting responsibility
In an effort to demonstrate its green credentials,
the British Government has been proudly boasting
introduction
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that its G8 presidency will be ‘carbon neutral’. It
promises to achieve this by ‘offsetting’ the
anticipated greenhouse gas emissions resulting from
the summit by investing approximately $90,000 in
supposedly climate-friendly projects in Africa.4 In
many ways, the attempt to make the summit
‘carbon neutral’ is emblematic of the degree to
which the climate debate has been corrupted by a
corrosive discourse. As a result, this offset culture
has emerged as one of the principle concepts of
‘action’ on climate change. But offsets are deeply
problematic and not, in the final analysis, a
solution to the crisis. 
Firstly, the money being invested elsewhere
invariably distracts from action to reduce
emissions at source. Northern governments and
industry are taking advantage of such offsetting
arrangements to postpone making the desperately
needed cuts at home. Secondly, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to guarantee that offset projects
lead to genuinely ‘additional’ reductions. There
simply is no guarantee that the supposed emission
savings from a project would not have happened
anyway without the offsetting investment. Thirdly,
the scientific basis upon which carbon calculations
of such projects are made is hotly contested. The
carbon estimates vary hugely and rely upon
accounting methodologies so flawed as to make
the Enron-Andersen dealings seem mild in
comparison. Many projects have delivered
significantly lower emission reductions than
predicted in their project documents.5
A project category particularly prone to such
overestimations is tree-planting, where verification
of the amount of carbon actually stored in the
forest ecosystem or tree plantation is virtually
impossible. In some cases companies have received
payments just to avoid felling existing forests.
Monoculture trees have also been planted on
carbon-rich peat bogs - emitting more carbon
dioxide than they ‘sink’. The worst examples have
involved projects replacing grassland ecosystems
with ecologically and socially destructive
monoculture plantations - described as ‘green
deserts’ by local people - in places such as Ecuador
and Brazil.
Cracks in the logic of these schemes emerge when
attempts are made to establish a solid equivalence
between the emissions one source makes with those
theoretically avoided or sequestered in trees
somewhere else. One side of the equation, the
emissions that one is responsible for, is
comparatively definite and quantifiable. The other
side, the emissions saving project, is marred in both
uncertainty with regards to the long-term progress
of the project (for instance, if the carbon from the
emissions is to be sequestered in trees, how long
will these trees still be standing and storing the
carbon?) and also with regards to limited scientific
knowledge of the carbon cycle. According to leading
scientists, calculating these carbon fluxes involves,
at best, variations in the estimates of 50% or more.6
But for the G8 nations seeking to demonstrate
vague commitment to climate action, the inherent
problems relating to offset culture and other
distractions such as emissions trading are swept
aside by a sleight of hand. The market, we are told,
is lean and green. The problem of climate change
requires not radical reductions at source, but the
‘invisible hand’ of the market to sweep up the mess
in the most cost effective manner possible. Part
economics and part philosophy, this reliance upon
the market represents an increasingly prevalent
paradigm in environmental legislation. 
This briefing will examine the origins of this
paradigm and its development in the context of
climate change, as well as the way it is being
enthusiastically applied as a panacea in other areas
of environmental policy as well. It argues that the
‘win-win’ rhetoric pervading the climate discourse
is both an attempt to confound and marginalise
those seeking more meaningful and effective action
on climate change, as well as contributing to
increased corporate power and further
commodification of natural resources such as the
earth's carbon-cycling capacity. The neoliberal ethic
embodied in power blocs such as the G8,
themselves highly dependent on the fossil fuel
economy, is ultimately what drives this agenda
forward. Free-market environmentalism and
increased trade and investment liberalisation in the
area of ‘environmental goods’ and ‘ecosystem
services’ is ultimately a false promise. For activists
seeking to engender meaningful social and
environmental change in the climate arena, these
trends must be challenged outright.
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The G8 (Group of 8) is a political forum and annual
meeting attended by the leaders of eight of the
most economically powerful countries: the United
States, Canada, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy,
France and Russia. It has been active since 1975
when then French President Mitterand invited the
world’s six largest economies to meet in France to
discuss the economic crisis created by the US
abandonment of the gold standard1 and the 1973
oil crisis. The initial G6 became the G7 in 1976
when Canada joined. In 1977, the head of state
who was then acting as the President of the
European Union was invited for the first time, and
each year is invited as a permanent, although non-
hosting member. Finally, the inclusion of Russia
took place over a period of time starting
informally in 1994 and concluding in 1997 at the
Summit in Denver, although the G7 continues to
meet without Russia before each G8 Summit to
discuss economic issues.
Although the G8 started out with a focus on
macroeconomic and trade issues, other issues,
such as energy supply, arms control and nuclear
non-proliferation, health, development and
terrorism have found their way over the years onto
the agenda. The G8 has also created a series of
ministerial forums that meet at the Summit and
throughout the year on specific topics, including
Trade Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Finance
Ministers, Environment Ministers, and Labour
Ministers. The Summit is presided over by each of
the Member States in turn for a full calendar year.
The country holding the Presidency proposes the
location and agenda and organises preparatory
meetings, giving them the opportunity to place a
personal stamp on the proceedings. The final
summit in the Summer is the conclusion of all the
previous meetings which have led up to it.
Describing itself as “an informal club for discussion
and co-operation by the leading industrialised
“The speeches that come out of the G8 on poverty,
climate change and the issue of the carbon market
are hypocritical. Because what causes poverty and
environmental damage is the current development
model, the logic of production and the consumer
logic of capitalist society.”
Marilda, Brazilian forest activist
part 1
the g8 and the climate change agenda
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countries,”2 the G8 has no official decision-making
powers. However, by virtue of its combined
economic, military and diplomatic power and
influence, the nations of the G8 have enormous
influence over multilateral institutions of global
governance, such as the UN Security Council, the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). These multilateral
institutions in turn have enormous impacts on
policies affecting climate change, from the
extraction of fossil fuels, the liberalisation of
trade and investment, to the negotiation and
implementation of the plans of action to deal with
the climate crisis.
The G8 meetings are fairly opaque in that there is
no transcript of the discussions and preparatory
documents are rarely released to the public.
Instead, at the end of each summit a communiqué
is issued that summarises the final outcome.
Although these G8 Communiqués typically refer to
that summit’s particular themes, they mainly
consist of, “a renewal of vows for neoliberal
globalisation and the reforms which enable this:
trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation,
labour market flexibility and macroeconomic
policies that are deflationary such as zero-deficit
budgeting3 and high interest rates.”4 The paradox is
that it is exactly this implementation of neo-liberal
reform that is exacerbating the other issues that
the G8 claims to be addressing, such as poverty in
the majority world, global security and as is shown
here, climate change. As one of the architects and
engines of neo-liberal globalisation, the G8 is
promoting an economic agenda as the cure-all
solution to climate change rather than
acknowledging it to be a major part of the problem.  
At the end of 2004, Tony Blair announced his two
priorities during Britain’s  presidency of the G8 in
2005: The plight of Africa and tackling climate
change. Blair's emphasis in Scotland is not the first
time that climate change has been on the G8
agenda. In July 2000 at the Okinawa, Japan,
Summit, the Heads of State agreed to create a
multi-stakeholder Renewable Energy Task Force as
a means of mitigating the impact of climate
change. The task force, which was mandated to
assess the barriers to renewable energy use in
developing countries as well as ways of expanding
its use in domestic markets, consisted of members
from government, industry, NGOs and international
organisations and was assisted by an Advisory
Group of over 50 recognised experts. After a series
of meetings, its recommendations were presented
at the 2001 Summit in Genoa, Italy, consisting of
calls for:
1 The adoption of a renewable energy target of
serving at least one billion people with renewable
energy by 2010.
2 The reform of International Financial Institutions
and Export Credit Agencies to dramatically
increase funding for renewable energies in
developing countries.
As one of the architects and
engines of neoliberal globalisation,
the G8 is promoting an economic
agenda as the cure-all solution to
climate change rather than
acknowledging it to be a major
part of the problem.  
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3 Phasing out G8 government subsidies for fossil
fuels and nuclear energy, while increasing research
and development for renewable energy in order to
create a ‘level playing field’ so that energy
markets can function properly.5
The suggestions of the task force were surprisingly
positive, apart from the fact that the proposals
were framed in the context of large scale,
centralised renewable energy infrastructure and
gave little weight to the possibility of prolific,
small scale, community controlled projects. This
was hardly surprising considering that the task
force was co-chaired by Mark Moody Stuart,
former Chief Executive Officer of petrol giant
Royal Dutch/Shell. In 2004, the Shell group was
one of the top five suppliers of solar photo-voltaic
products and one of the top ten suppliers of wind
energy in the world, and looking to expand its
market share in these sectors.6 Unfortunately, the
US and Canada led the way in rejecting the
package of recommendations in Genoa, and the
events of 9-11 a few months later served to re-
shuffle political priorities so that the proposals of
the task force which had been applauded by a
wide array of organisations, were ignored or
forgotten.Climate change was to remain a
footnote in the successive summits until 2005.
Since the beginning of the century, Tony Blair has
regularly brought up the subject of climate change
in speeches, issuing increasingly stark warnings as
to the seriousness of its consequences and
promising to take urgent action in dealing with it.
In January 2005, during a special address he made
to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Blair
announced that, “this year offers a set of unique
opportunities. I am committed to using the UK’s G8
and EU Presidencies to try and make a
breakthrough... on climate change.”7
In the same speech Blair outlined his three point
plan of action. Firstly, to secure an agreement as to
the basic science of climate change and the threat
it poses. Secondly, an agreement to develop a
package of technologically-based, practical
measures to cut emissions, through energy
efficiency, renewable energy sources and cleaner
fossil fuels etc. And finally, “to work in partnership
with the rapidly developing economies like China,
India, Brazil and South Africa to find a way for them
to grow and develop as low carbon economies.”8
Figure 1 - Source: International Energy Agency
% of global population 2002
% of global CO2 emissions 2002
(fuel combustion only)
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Blair has admitted himself that, “we cannot aspire to
such [global] leadership unless we are seen to be
following our own advice,”9 but even a cursory
examination of the climate change reality behind
Blair's rhetoric during his first two terms as Prime
Minister greatly undermines his credibility in
assuming this role of global leadership. The Labour
Party promised in both its 1997 and 2002 elections
that it would reduce CO2 levels by 20% (from 1990
levels) by 2010, while the 2003 Energy White Paper
subsequently announced that the government would
put Britain on a pathway to achieve CO2 emissions
reductions of 60% by 2050.  However figures released
in April 2005 from the Department of Trade and
Industry showed that CO2 emissions had actually risen
by increments of 2.2% in 2003, and 1.5% in 200410 and
even Blair had to admit that his government was
unlikely to fulfill its 2010 promise.11
While many predict that it is still possible for
Britain to come through on its Kyoto commitment
of reducing CO2 emissions by 12.5% by 2012, it is
important to note that the majority of these
reductions occurred in the period of 1990-1997
during the large scale switch of British industry
from coal to gas, accompanied by large scale social
upheaval through then Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher’s closure of numerous coal mines. From
1997 when Tony Blair came to power to 2003, there
was a net increase of 0.03% in CO2 levels in
Britain,12 which has prompted a report from the
Royal Society in May 2005 to cast doubt on Britain
achieving even its Kyoto commitment.13 An audit of
the UK Climate Change Programme in 2003 by the
Sustainable Development Commission revealed that,
“the Government's projections do not yet show the
radical shift needed to a low carbon path, nor are
there policies in place to achieve more sustainable
patterns of energy generation and consumption.”14
This lack of significant domestic reductions is not
inconsistent with other matters of policy and
legislation related to climate change and energy
that have been witnessed in the UK under Blair:
aviation
Despite the fact that aviation could account for
36% of Britain’s total emissions by 2030,15 and
contrary to the advice of the Royal Commission,
there has been a huge expansion in the sector with
new runways underway in Stansted, Heathrow and
Birmingham airports, as well as safeguarding of
land for a new runway at Edinburgh and the
extension of many others. Aviation fuel remains
the only fossil fuel exempt from taxation.
energy efficiency
In November 2004, MPs were instructed by Blair to
vote against amendments to the Housing Bill that
would increase energy efficiency of the housing
stock and would have increased the efficiency
standards of social housing. Although the
amendment on overall energy efficiency was
eventually accepted under pressure from within the
party, the leadership remained adamant in rejecting
concrete action on energy efficiency in social
housing. In 2002, domestic energy consumption
accounted for 27% of Britain’s CO2 emissions, and
half of this figure was for space heating16. A typical
newly built home in Britain uses three times as
much energy as one in Denmark or Germany.17
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Blair's domestic record on climate change
With the introduction in 2001 of the New
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) favouring
‘cheapest’ forms of energy, the market has been
liberalised so as to starve Combined Heat and
Power (CHP) plants which dramatically increase
efficiency and reduce emissions, of much needed
support, resulting in a decline of the sector.
Policy measures like NETA have prompted the
Department of Trade and Industry to enthuse that,
“the UK is seen as being at the forefront of a
world-wide movement towards liberalisation, and
many features of the UK system have been
imitated elsewhere.”18
emissions trading
At the end of 2004, Blair succumbed to pressure
from the Confederation of Business and Industry to
increase the amount of CO2 by 3% that British
industry is allowed to emit under the recently
introduced European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS).19 Blair is currently taking the
European Commission to a subsidiary of the
European Court of Justice over its refusal to
accept this increase to Britain’s emissions
allowance.20 The associate director of the Carbon
Trust, the Government-funded private company
charged with helping business adapt to constraints
on emissions, said that Blair’s attempts to increase
the British allocation had “undermined the UK's
considerable authority on climate change and
could significantly damage the EU-ETS,” and that
it could result in a “competitive race to the
bottom between Member States.”21
renewable energy
The Government has set a target of 10% of
electricity to come from renewable sources by
2010, with an aspiration to double this by 2020.
Although there has been some investment from the
Government, and it is the first in the EU to give
proper support to wave and tidal technologies, it
has failed to remove unnecessary obstacles to the
development of the sector. Around 7-8% of the
2010 target is earmarked to come from onshore
and offshore wind farms.22 However OFGEM, the
gas and electricity regulator, is creating obstacles
to the development of a second round of offshore
wind farms by demanding unreasonably high fees
for connection to the grid, thus jeopardizing the
achievement of the 2010 target. Such barriers to
renewable energy development have been
highlighted by Blair for removal, but he has been
unwilling to use his powers of intervention in this
case.23 During 2003-04, the amount of electricity
generated from renewable energy was 2.4%, just
over half the target of 4.3%.24
The House of Commons Environmental Audit
Committee described the Government’s G8 climate
change objectives as “dismally unambitious”, and
suggested that its focus on climate science and
technology “is creating the appearance of
activity… whilst evading the harder national and
international political decisions which must be
made if there is to be any solution.”25 Blair is not
alone in evading these difficult decisions. He is
complicit with the other G8 governments in
presenting a façade of concerned concerted action
while continuing to follow ‘business-as-usual’.
9
The House of Commons
Environmental Audit
Committee described the
Government’s G8 climate
change objectives as 
“dismally unambitious” 
likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
The EU committed itself to reducing its
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 8% during the
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period of 2008-
2012. This target is shared between the Member
States under a legally binding burden-sharing
agreement, which sets individual emissions
targets for each Member State, with some making
reductions, some stabilizing and some being
allowed increases on 1990 levels. This collective
commitment is known as the ‘EU-15 bubble,’
referring to the 15 countries that were EU
members before its expansion in 2004. Projections
released by the European Environment Agency
(EEA) in 2004 estimate that the EU-15 countries
will cut their total emissions by 7.7% by 2010. In
addition to this, plans by six EU-15 states to use
credits gained from the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible
mechanisms would contribute a further reduction
of approximately 1.1%, taking the total to 8.8%.1
The report also stressed that success in achieving
the target is dependent on some countries making
even greater cuts than they had committed to in
order to compensate for others (Denmark, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and, to a small extent, Germany)
missing their targets. Without these excess cuts,
the projected reduction will only be 6.5%. 
These projections seem quite optimistic when
compared with the real emissions data released
by the EEA. In 2003, the EU-15 had only reduced
its emissions by 1.7% below 1990 levels. Although
emissions decreased in most economic sectors
during this period, the transport sector
(especially road transport) saw an emissions
increase of 22%.2 Although this 1.7% may appear
to be a small but significant step in the right
direction, it should be qualified by noting that
the majority of this reduction is attributable to
the cuts in emissions from Britain and Germany,
which in turn are largely attributable to
coincidental economic and industrial restructuring
at the time in those countries. As such, the cuts
are not the result of a concerted effort by these
countries to address the climate crisis (see the
individual profiles of these countries).
the european union emissions trading scheme
The beginning of 2005 saw the launch of the
world’s first large-scale GHG trading programme,
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS), covering around 12,000 factories and
power plants3 (generically referred to as
‘installations’) in 25 countries and five major
industrial sectors.4 The combination of its size
and institutional complexity means that it is a
figure 2 - source: International Energy Agency
the european union
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landmark in the development of market-based
responses to climate change. Up until 2005, 95%
of GHG credits traded have been created via
project mechanisms such as Clean Development
Mechanisms and Joint Implementation, but the
EU-ETS has been created to increase the
potential to create tradable allowances through
domestic reductions. By facilitating trade and
allowing for a more flexible determination of how
and where emissions are reduced, the European
Commission claims that Kyoto targets can be
achieved at an annual cost of 2.9 to 3.7 billion
(which is less than 0.1 per cent of the GDP in the
EU), compared to double that cost (around 6.8
billion) without the EU ETS.5 However a briefing
paper from the environmental consultants Enviros
in 2004 shows that the leniency in allocating
allowances will allow European industry to emit
from 5-11% CO2 more than on 2000 levels by the
end of the ‘warm-up’ phase of the market.6
The ‘warm-up’ phase takes place from 2005-2007,
followed by successive five-year periods with the
second phase being timed to coincide with the
first period of Kyoto commitment. The second
phase is expected to involve tighter caps in line
with the overall Kyoto targets, and may expand
to include GHGs other than CO2 as well as other
industrial sectors. In its most simple form,
industrial sites have been set emissions limits and
if they fail to meet their targets in any of the
phases, they will have to buy surplus credits (or
‘allowances’ as they are often referred to) from
those sites that are below their target. Although
only the EU-15 emissions are counted towards
meeting the first Kyoto commitment, all the EU
countries have National Allocation Plans (NAPs)
and can trade within the market.
One of the most controversial aspects of the EU-
ETS has been the allocation of emission
allowances, which was negotiated between the
respective installations covered by the scheme and
the national governments responsible for the
allocation. The NAP of each EU Member State
describes how emission allowances have been
distributed among the polluting sources covered by
the scheme. The plans have proven to be
enormously complicated to compile, claiming to
incorporate factors such as “the levels of effort
and assessment of progress towards Kyoto targets,
the competitive impacts between sectors and
countries, consistency with other EU legislation,
transparency, and the possibilities for
technological improvement.”7
Many felt that the NAPs were unrealistically
generous. One market participant quoted by trade
analysts Point Carbon said that, “the NAPs are far
too lax, and all eyes are now on the European
Commission to see how it will handle the
situation. The EC needs to bear in mind that if
the scheme is not taken seriously in the first
phase, that will either put more pressure on the
second phase or make it difficult for the EC to
establish credibility for Phase II.”8 The Enviros
report warns that the lenient NAPs will lead to
low allowance prices and deter investment in low-
carbon technologies.9 In the majority of cases,
the permits were provided free of charge to
industry which can now make substantial profits
from selling this generous hand-out. Given that
the most polluting industries have received such a
generous slice of the emissions pie, the rest of
the economy will have to bear the burden of
making more expensive cuts in order to stay
within the limit of what is left. 
energy subsidies
Figure 3 shows the amount of subsidies allocated
to the different energy industries for the year
2001 in the EU-15 according to the EEA. The
report differentiates between two types of
subsidy. It defines ‘on-budget’ subsidies as “cash
transfers paid directly to industrial producers,
consumers and other related bodies, such as
research institutes”, and are clearly visible on
national budgets as government expenditure. In
contrast, ‘off-budget’ subsidies are less visible
and do not appear as a direct pay-out. They
reflect the money that a government does not
receive through a range of policies such as tax
exemptions, credit and rebates. ‘Off-budget’
subsidies may also be registered as more abstract
factors such as the preferential allocation of
access to natural resources and planning
consent.10 The EEA figures do not include
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environmental externalities – the damage that is
caused to the environment through the
production, distribution and consumption of
energy such as the impacts of human-induced
climate change or the long-term management of
nuclear waste. If externalities were included, it
would enormously increase the fossil fuel and
nuclear energy subsidies relative to those of
renewable energies, which have no or very
localised impact. 
Fossil Fuels – At 13 billion, this was the most
heavily subsidised energy source in 2001. Germany
was the single greatest subsidiser with over 4
billion in on-budget subsidies, and about 3.5
billion in off-budget subsidies through its
exemption from taxation under the 1999
ecological tax reform. Between 1970 and 2003,
the coal industry  received 120 billion from the
German government.11 The highest levels of off-
budget support for this energy sector occurred in
Italy, the Netherlands and Britain. Britain
supported oil and gas with reduced rates on VAT
(5%) on domestic oil and gas, accounting for about
1.4 billion, while Italy’s reduced rate of VAT on
domestic gas (10%) amounted to a subsidy of
about 0.9 billion. The low level of on-budget
subsidies for this sector is a result of the bulk of
oil reserve development occurring outside of
Europe, and also the fact that the industry in
Europe is largely privatised and receives very few
on-budget subsidies.
Nuclear Power – It is important to remember
that one subsidy that is not included in these
figures is that under international treaty, the
nuclear industry does not have to take out
insurance to financially cover the catastrophic
consequences of a serious nuclear incident. The
cost of insuring against this is too high for any
insurer to undertake, and so the size of this off-
budget subsidy actually makes the industry
viable. The on-budget subsidies for nuclear
energy come from research and development
(R&D) grants from France, Germany, Italy and the
European Community. Over the last 30 years,
around 60 billion has gone into nuclear R&D
from countries in the EU, more than for any
other energy source.12
Renewable Energy – All of the EU-15 provide
some measure of support for renewable energy
through different means of off-budget support and
very little in the way of on-budget assistance, but
as the graph shows, this is somewhat dwarfed by
the amount for fossil fuels. In 2001, the greatest
levels of support came from Germany and Italy,
where over 1 billion was provided, mainly in the
form of ‘feed-in tariffs’, which is the price per
unit of electricity that a utility or supplier has to
pay for renewable electricity from private
generators. Non-hydro renewable energy projects
received funding worth 323 million between 1990
and 2003 from the European Investment Bank, out
of a total of 18 billion that was loaned to energy
projects.13 Despite the fact that promoting
renewable energy production is said to be a policy
priority across the EU, the funding reality does
not seem to match the rhetoric.
Figure 3 - 2001 Indicative Estimate of Total
Energy Subsidies, EU 15
Source: European Energy Agency
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russian ratification and ‘hot air’
The political arena in which Blair has positioned
himself as a ‘global leader’ on climate change at
the G8 is one characterised by the recent
introduction of the Kyoto Protocol. The treaty
could only become legally binding when ratified by
enough countries to cover at least 55% of the
‘rich’ world’s greenhouse gases at 1990 levels.
When the US, which then accounted for about a
third of these emissions, withdrew from the Kyoto
Protocol in March 2001, it was necessary to bring
Russia, and its 17% share of global emissions on
board in order to bring the treaty into force.
Initially, President Putin would not commit to
Russia's ratification. Commenting at a World
Climate Change Conference in 2003, Putin
explained his position: “People say we are a
northern country and a temperature 2-3 degrees
warmer would not be scary, maybe it would be
good... You would have to spend less money on fur
coats and other warm things.”1 Andrei Illarionov,
one of Putin’s senior economic advisers, whose
free-market influence is described by the Asian
Wall Street Journal as being, “the best thing that
ever happened to Russia,”2 was so opposed to
ratification that he described the protocol as, “a
death pact… because its main aim is to strangle
economic growth and economic activity in
countries… an international Auschwitz.”3
Behind such remarks, it appears that Russia has
been involved in much political wrangling to
maximise the benefit from its crucial ratification.
Initially, Russia stood to benefit greatly from the
Kyoto agreement through the trade in its ‘hot air.’
Industrialised countries pledged emission
reductions in relation to the level of GHG
“Powerful interests have hijacked the climate debate,
and are forcing a corporate, free market approach
- to the earth's peril,”
Tom Goldtooth, 
Indigenous Environmental Network
part 2
fiddling while rome burns: the politics of kyoto
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problems with kyoto: measurements and regulation
The fundamental problem with Carbon Trading and the Kyoto Protocol is that it relies on an accuracy of scientific
measurement that is often impossible to attain. Establishing a solid, quantifiable basis for the trade of actual CO2
emissions for hypothetical ‘avoided’ emissions through the use of carbon sinks, JI and CDM projects requires a
biophysical knowledge of carbon flows among the atmosphere, biosphere and lithosphere that does not currently
exist.1 For example, after an enormous international research project in 2005 to quantify the flux of carbon
dioxide between Russia's forests and the atmosphere, climate scientists in the journal Nature said that the range
of uncertainty still varies from plus or minus 50%.2 This uncertainty is of particular concern given that Russia
received the largest allowance of any country for carbon sinks due to its large areas of forested land. In addition
to the limitations of scientific knowledge in quantifying the flows in carbon cycles, there are also the various
social and political obstacles to the accurate reporting and collecting of data, as in the case of Russia and the
classified nature of emissions data relating to its defense complex in 1990.
Lack of regulation and enforcement present many problems in ensuring the accuracy of emissions data. In most
countries the data is provided by polluting companies, resulting in an economic incentive for companies to cheat,
and it appears that the prevention of such cheating is getting more lax rather than stricter. The Integrated
Pollution Prevention and Control system monitors and controls industrial emissions across England and Wales and
relies heavily on the emitters taking samples of their emissions and reporting the results to the British
Environment Agency. A report from the Environmental Agency suggested that 40% of sites did not have
satisfactory monitoring procedures in place. Despite this, from 2001 to 2005, the level of independent monitoring
of industrial sites’ emissions dropped by three-quarters.3
Regulation has also proved to be an issue with the implementation of CDM projects. There have been a string of
incidents involving the companies that are authorized to ensure emissions reductions are actually taking place.
One company had not even visited the project it was validating and was also part-owned by a parent-company
that was an investor in the CDM project. After a meeting with the CDM Executive Board in 2005, the validators
and applicant-validators agreed to take measures to avoid such incidents in the future, without specifying what
such measures would consist of or how they would be enforced. Einar Telnes from the validation company DNV
said, “We must establish self-justice internally.”4
image by EETM
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emissions in 1990. The collapse of the Russian
economy in the 90s meant that its greenhouse gas
emissions dropped by over a third.4 The resulting
‘surplus’ of unused emission permits allows Russia
(and several other Eastern European countries), to
now sell them to other industrialised countries
who pledged to reduce emissions but might be
tempted to buy their way out of domestic action
by buying Russian ‘hot air’.  
On top of this ‘hot air’, Russian negotiators were
able to exploit their crucial ratifying role during
the 7th United Nations Climate Conference in
Marrakech to forcefully and successfully push for
an allowance of 33 million ‘carbon sink’ credits on
account of its vast forests, which was double the
figure that had been previously discussed. Russian
figures are somewhat uncertain because all the
data relating to CO2 emissions of the Soviet
defence-industrial complex were classified at the
time of the baseline year 1990.5 Even today Russia
still lacks a standard unified system of reporting
for industrial facilities, which is one of the many
ambiguities that cast so much doubt on the
supposed empirical base to emissions trading.6
These factors have left Russia with an enormous
pool of surplus credits it can now sell. The
existence of this ‘hot air’ is cause for concern as
the excess supply of credits in the market may
depress prices and undermine the incentive to
invest in real reductions—even real reductions in
Russia and other Eastern European countries. 
Economists initially suggested that the permits
might have fetched prices as high as $200 per
tonne, but the withdrawal of the US from the
Kyoto Protocol meant that Russia lost the single
biggest, wealthiest customer for its hot air
surplus. Russia has been told by other European
countries that there is no significant demand for
its hot air, and figures as low as $3.50 to $5 per
tonne have been suggested, with some in Russia
arguing that this was an unacceptable figure
while $30-40 per tonne would be much more
reasonable.7 It remains to be seen whether the
European signatories will achieve their emission
reduction targets without needing to purchase
Russian credits. However, Canada announced in
February 2005 that it will need to buy foreign
credits in order to meet its reduction
commitments.8 Japan, which does not appear on
course to achieve its 6% reduction target9 may
also be a potential customer.
Though the dramatic devaluation of the potential
market dampened Russia’s enthusiasm for the
Protocol, it was still in a position to extract
favours in return for its ratification, specifically as
leverage with the EU to win more favourable
conditions in negotiations on accession to the
World Trade Organisation. In May 2004, Putin
announced that, “the EU has met us halfway in
talks over the WTO, and that cannot but affect
positively our position on the Kyoto Protocol,”10
and in October 2004, Russia agreed to ratify the
treaty. Previously the negotiations had stalled over
the European Union's insistence that Russia end its
practice of setting artificially low domestic energy
tariffs, which Brussels claimed gave unfair trade
benefits to Russian producers.11 It would seem that
Russia agreed to ratify the Protocol, while making
a token increase in its domestic energy tariffs that
would make it appear that it had acquiesced to
the demands of the EU who would then accept its
entry into the WTO. Russia, the largest nation to
be left out of the 147-member world trade
governing body, must still strike agreements with
the United States and China before becoming a full
member, giving it much greater access to lucrative
foreign markets under very beneficial conditions.
Two other factors may have influenced Putin to
push for Russia's ratification. Firstly, it may have
bolstered his tarnished international reputation
following recent heavy-handed crackdowns on
independent provincial governors and dissident
journalists. And secondly, Russia is still positioning
itself to be accepted in the ranks of the economic
elite of the G7 from which it is currently excluded,
and its Kyoto ratification may have partially been
an apparently unsuccessful attempt to gain favour
in this endeavour. Next year, Russia will be hosting
the G8, but it seems that Germany will inherit the
chair of the G7 from the UK.
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One of the key questions of the G8 remains how to
engage the US in taking action on emissions
reductions. US President Bush has remained
steadfastly opposed to any commitment to the
Kyoto Protocol. In his statement in March 2001
when he rejected the treaty, he said that while he
was in favour of the development of “technologies,
market-based incentives, and other innovative
approaches to meeting the challenge of global
climate change”, he would “not accept a plan that
will harm our economy and hurt American
workers”.12 The US administration argues that the
fact that countries in the Majority World are not
required to make any commitment to making
emissions cuts in the first reduction period would
give them an unfair economic advantage over US
industry. While it is historically the West's
profligate use of fossil fuels that has caused
climate change, the emissions of rapidly expanding
economies like India and China now rank amongst
the worlds highest net emitters.13
Facing international criticism for his isolationist
stance, in February 2001 Bush presented a domestic
plan based on voluntary action in place of the
mandatory emission cuts of the Kyoto agreement.
Entitled the Clean Skies Legislation, it consisted of
measures to cut power plant emissions of sulphur
dioxide, mercury and other atmospheric pollutants
through a package of tax incentives and tradable
pollution credits. He committed his administration
to cutting “greenhouse gas intensity” by 18% over
the next 10 years, but crucially based the
calculation of this intensity on greenhouse gases
produced relative to the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). This linking of emissions to GDP reflects
Bush’s dogmatic belief that his “approach
recognizes that economic growth is the solution,
not the problem. Because a nation that grows its
economy is a nation that can afford investments
and new technologies.”14 The ratio however
obscures the fact that no net cuts in emissions
would be made under this plan. Chris Flavin, energy
analyst and President of the Worldwatch Institute
estimated that it would leave the US producing at
least 35% more GHGs in 2010 than would be
permitted under the Kyoto Protocol.15
The Bush administration intends its Clean Skies
Legislation to be a model that other developing
countries could aspire to as an alternative to the
Kyoto Protocol, when after the first period of
commitment, other countries will be obliged to
commit to the treaty. Bush stated that, “The
greenhouse gas intensity approach I put forward
today gives developing countries a yardstick for
progress on climate change that recognizes their
right to economic development..... The United
States will not interfere with the plans of any
nation that chooses to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
But I will intend [sic] to work with nations,
especially the poor and developing nations, to
show the world that there is a better approach.”16
A lot of NGO, governmental and civil society
activity has gone into an unsuccessful attempt to
pressure Bush to ratify the Protocol, while much
less attention has been paid to how Bush might be
influencing other countries’ attitudes towards
emissions reductions. 
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the question of the usa
It was reported in April 2005 that Blair was
intending to use his ‘special relationship’ with the
US and the political favour he had garnered with
Bush through his support of the invasion of Iraq to
entice the US into a new climate initiative that
could bypass the White House's disdain of the Kyoto
Protocol. Downing Street confirmed that Blair had
“lengthy discussions” with Bush on the matter, and
The Times newspaper reported that the ‘Kyoto-lite’
deal involved “scientific agreement on the scale
and nature of the threat, as well as an
international programme to develop the technology
needed for renewable energy and the reduction of
carbon emissions.”17
However, in the run-up to the 2005 summit, the US
appeared to still be firmly opposed to Blair’s
attempts to draw them into any kind of
commitment. At one of the G8 climate change
meetings that took place in May 2005, US climate
negotiator Harlan Watson reported that, “We’re
still not convinced of the need to move forward
quite so quickly, particularly if we would risk not
only our economy but the world’s economy if we
move too quickly.”18 There is a great deal of
discussion as to what will happen after the first
period of commitment ends in 2012. According to
the European Commission, “the first and biggest
challenge will be to draw all major world emitters
- including the US and China - into a binding
pollution-cutting scheme.”19 One idea being floated
by the Commission is to gather the 7 largest
emitters as “a relatively small group - EU, US,
Canada, Russia, Japan, China and India […to] try to
accelerate progress at the global level by discussing
reductions […] in parallel with the UN forum”.20
In May 2005, experts nominated by more than 100
governments met in Bonn to officially start the
lengthy discussions of the post 2012 regime. The
talks immediately revealed a fault-line between
those that want to continue with greater Kyoto-style
commitments, and those who want to start again
with a different set of targets or even no legally
binding targets at all. Possible alternatives
suggested included the US style measure of linking
reductions to GDP, as well as targets based on
commitment to the introduction of renewable
energy technology.21
The desire to keep the US at the negotiating table
resulted in all manner of concessions that greatly
diluted the original Kyoto Protocol,22 a process
aided and abetted by numerous corporate lobby
groups.23 The combination of this political will to
include the US at all costs, the general trend
towards market based ‘solutions’ and Bush’s
intention to act as a role model for Kyoto
alternatives, undermines the probability of the
stricter, genuine emissions cuts that are being hoped
for in the second Kyoto period. 
Figure 5 - per capita CO2 emissions 2002
Source: International Energy Agency
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life after kyoto
There seems to be a sudden resurgence in support for
nuclear energy driven by the seriousness of the threat
of climate change. Prominent politicians including
Bush, ignoring the significant CO2 emissions involved
in the extraction, transport and containment of
nuclear material, are claiming that nuclear energy is
emissions-free. Tony Blair’s chief scientific adviser
stated in May 2005 that Britain might need one more
round of nuclear power plants.24 France already
generates a staggering 78% of its energy needs from
its 58 nuclear reactors.25 Unexpected support is now
coming from a number of prominent ‘green’ groups
and individuals who are now also reluctantly
advocating the expansion of nuclear infrastructure.
The most prominent example of this is James
Lovelock, scientist and famed creator of the Gaia
hypothesis of the Earth as a self-regulating organism,
who last year declared that, “civilisation is in
imminent danger and has to use nuclear - the one
safe, available, energy source - now or suffer the
pain soon to be inflicted by our outraged planet.”26
The nuclear industry, after having been severely
discredited at the hands of public opinion and
social movements in response to horrific accidents
in the 70s and 80s, is suddenly being rehabilitated
as a potential saviour. Many industry eyes are
looking to the G8 for the re-launch of nuclear
power as a clean, climate-friendly energy source.
In one industry magazine, the writer hypothesizes
the following possible scenario:
“Nuclear is consistently profiled at the G8 in terms
of its role as a zero emissions technology. The USA
and other G8 countries support the principle of
future nuclear and there is agreement between the
UK and the USA to collaborate more closely on
licensing. This is announced alongside a major UK-US
carbon capture and storage initiative to reduce
emissions from fossil fuel industries in both
developed and transition economies. The UK is seen
to partly deliver on its promise to bring the USA
back on board in the battle against climate change,
and nuclear is increasingly popularised as part of the
solution, not the problem.”27
In this statement, nuclear power goes hand-in-hand
with carbon storage as simply another one of the
technological solutions that we need to combat
climate change. Blair’s repeated refrain for the G8
to “invest on a large scale in existing technologies
and to stimulate innovation into new low carbon
technologies for deployment in the longer term”28
could be an implicit reference to nuclear expansion
as part of the G8 climate measures. There has been
recent media speculation that Blair “is drawing up
secret plans to create a new generation of nuclear
power stations as the centrepiece of the
Government's drive to combat climate change.”29 It
remains to be seen how much of these plans will be
included in Blair’s climate change strategy at
Gleneagles, although a draft communiqué leaked in
June 2005 explicitly endorsed the use of “zero-
carbon” nuclear power.30
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Prominent politicians including Bush,
ignoring the significant CO2 emissions
involved in the extraction, transport and
containment of nuclear material, are
claiming that nuclear energy is
emissions-free.
the nuclear option?
carbon capture and storage
One of the technological ‘quick-fixes’ being pioneered is that of carbon capture and storage. This
involves capturing the CO2 that would otherwise be emitted when fossil fuels are burnt in power stations
in a chemical process using liquid solvents. This ‘liquefied’ CO2 is then pumped out and stored
underground in disused oil and gas fields or in locations on the seabed to avoid it entering into the
atmosphere. In June 2005, the British government offered a $48 million funding package for the
development of plans to capture CO2 and store it in depleted North Sea oil and gas fields.1 Concerns
about this process include:
· Uncertainty as to whether storage of ‘liquefied’ CO2 can be made permanent. While oil and gas fields
are reasonably well understood over periods of a few decades, the long-term performance of seals and the
character of other formations such as saline aquifers is much less well understood. CO2 would need to be
trapped permanently - at least tens of thousands of years, and some see stored carbon as a bequeathed
hazard for future generations.
· Health effects. Slow leakage through soils and catastrophic leaks from pipelines can affect human
health and ecosystems. CO2 in high concentrations asphyxiates. 
· It would divert investment in the installation and development of renewable energy capacity in
favour of the continued dependence on fossil fuels. Carbon sequestration and storage does nothing to
address the other problems associated with the fossil fuel industry, such as the exploitation of the
Majority World, health problems from air pollution, deforestation, oil spills and the support of
repressive regimes.2
photo by dan taylor
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Figure 6  Source: International Energy Agency
country profile: france
likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
France has agreed to stabilise its emissions at 1990 levels by
2008-2012. To this end, a national climate plan was issued in
2004 including some 60 measures that were aimed at
achieving its Kyoto target. This plan drew heavy criticism
from environmental groups for relying largely on the good
will of the major-emitters and information campaigns.
France has managed to keep its emissions relatively low
throughout the 90s due to its heavy reliance on nuclear
power, despite the fact that over the decade emissions from
transport were up by 26% and up by 12% from domestic
heating.1 It seems that they will still not be able to achieve
their targets without the use of flexible mechanisms. In March
2005, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin proposed that
France establish a 50 million carbon fund to purchase credits
through CDM and Joint Implementation projects.2
emissions trading
The French NAP set itself a total allowance of 371.7 million
tonnes of CO2 for the first period of the trading scheme,
which accounted for about 6.6% of the total allowances
amongst the 25 EU countries.3 The initial NAP allocation from
France was rejected by the EC on the grounds that it
exceeded the projected cuts necessary to meet the overall
EU Kyoto target, but in December 2004 the amended
allocation was accepted by the EU.4 French state-owned
entity Gaz de France is an investor in the World Bank's
Prototype Carbon Fund.
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part 3
‘developing’ the majority world:
the g8, climate change and international financial institutions
“In an absurd contradiction the World Bank facilitates
these false, market-based approaches to climate
change while at the same time it is promoting, on a
far greater scale, the continued exploration for, and
extraction and burning of fossil fuels – many of which
are to ensure increased emissions of the North.” 
Marcelo Calazans, FASE-ES, Brazil
“Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) are public agencies
that provide government-backed loans, guarantees
and insurance to corporations from their home
country that seek to do business overseas in
developing countries and emerging markets. Most
industrialized nations have at least one ECA. They
are collectively bigger than the World Bank Group
(WBG) and finance more private-sector projects in
the majority world than any other institution.
Most of them however have no social or
environmental standards, and are keen to offer
credit with the least binding environmental
restrictions possible, leading critics to accuse
them of funding projects with harmful impact to
both the environment and local communities.”
ECA-Watch
the g8 and export credit agencies
Apart from a potential resurgence of nuclear power
in Northern countries, there are a number of nuclear
facilities being developed in the Majority World,
many of them with the direct involvement of G8
countries through ECAs. In 2001, 25 nuclear reactors
were under construction throughout the world. Of,
these 14 were being funded in part by an ECA from a
G8 country.1 China is the key country for the
construction of new reactors, accounting for over a
quarter of them. All of these reactors receive
financial support from at least one ECA of a G8
country. In 1992 alone, over $6 billion of funds from
the G8 ECAs was earmarked for the new reactors.2 It
is one of the serious concerns with regards to
current nuclear expansion that agencies which have
been so heavily criticised for lack of transparency
and environmental and social regulation should be so
engaged in the development of such potentially
catastrophic technologies. 
ECAs are also heavily committed to the
development of fossil fuel projects in the Majority
World. Instead of decelerating the dependence of
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countries in the Majority World on
fossil fuels, ECAs are investing
heavily in their long-term
consumption and therefore GHG
emissions. A report from the World
Resources Institute highlights the
gravity of this situation, showing
that from 1994-1999, ECAs co-
financed (through loans, risk
guarantees or investment
insurance) $103 billion in exports
and projects for oil and gas
development, fossil-fuel power,
transportation infrastructure,
aircraft sales and energy-intensive
manufacturing. 
The biggest recipients of this
financing included the highest,
developing country3 emitters,
China, India, and Brazil, while the
G7 countries provided the majority
of this funding through agencies which mostly had
no formal environmental assessment policies,
disclosed almost no environmental information to
the public, and did not evaluate the emissions of
the projects they financed.4
Investment in this fossil fuel infrastructure now
results in increased emissions for decades to
come, with the average power plant functioning
for 30 to 40 years. There is a great deal of
concern that the expansion of fossil-fuel plants by
non-Kyoto signatories will negate the modest
emissions cuts that are being aimed for. In his
study “The Price of Power,”5 Andrew Simms gives
the example of two major US-based ECAs, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the
Export-Import Bank, which between 1992 and 2002
were responsible for the investment of about $32
billion in fossil fuel extraction and power plant
construction in the Majority World. One study
estimated that a staggering 29.3 billion tonnes of
CO2 (roughly equivalent to the current annual
global total of CO2 emissions that humans are
responsible for) could result over the lifetime of
fossil fuel plants receiving support from these two
agencies between the years of 1992 and 1998
alone.6 In 2004 there were plans in various stages
of development to build nearly 850 new coal-fired
power plants in India, China and the US. According
to an analysis of the construction data by the
Christian Science Monitor, by 2012 these plants are
expected to emit as much as 2.7 billion tonnes of
CO2 each year, while countries who adopted
emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol are
supposed to have cut their CO2 emissions by some
483 million tonnes by this time.7
Civil society organisations have repeatedly called
for ECAs to switch from financing carbon-intensive
projects to renewable energy technologies. As has
already been noted in this briefing, such
institutional reform was also one of the key
proposals of the G8 Renewable Energy Task Force,
and at COP 7 in Marrakech, governments agreed as
part of Kyoto that ECAs should be encouraging the
global transfer of climate-friendly technologies. At
the G8 Okinawa summit in 1999, the G8 heads of
state agreed to negotiate common environmental
guidelines for ECAs. To date, consensus has not
been reached. Where there has been discussion,
there has been a noticeable lack of reference to
evaluating project impacts on greenhouse gas
emissions or contributions to energy-efficiency
improvements.8 This seems contrary to Blair’s
purported aim for the G8 to work “with the rapidly
developing economies like China, India, Brazil and
South Africa to find a way for them to grow and
develop as low carbon economies”.9
Figure 7: 2002 Primary Energy Supply 
(fossil fuels and nuclear power) 
Source: International Energy Agency
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ECAs are not the only way that the G8 countries are
expanding the carbon economies of the Majority
World. Subsidies are difficult to quantify, as often
they do not consist of a monetary value like a
direct financial transfer, but could come in the
form of trade restrictions, regulatory instruments,
preferential tax treatment, company bail outs or
publicly funded research and development. A large
part of the workings of the G8, especially in terms
of fostering consensus amongst the global economic
elite can be seen as forms of non-financial subsidies
that carry a great deal of influence. However in
terms of purely monetary estimates, one well-
researched study using a variety of sources suggests
that between 1995 and 1998, fossil fuel energy in
the OECD nations was subsidised at about $73
billion per year, and in non-OECD countries, the
figure was even higher - $162 billion.10
The body of criticism of fossil fuel subsidies is
overwhelming. A report from the United Nations
Environment Programme and the International
Energy Agency in 2002 reported that, “subsidies
that encourage the production and use of fossil
fuels are usually bad for the environment. They
can also be very costly, placing heavy burdens on
government finances, undermining investment in
the energy sector and reducing incentives to use
the disadvantages of fossil fuel subsidies
“Subsidies that lower consumer prices lead to higher
energy use and reduced incentives for energy
efficiency
Direct subsidies in the form of grants and tax
exemptions act as a drain on government finances
Consumption subsidies in developing countries
either create higher demand for fossil fuel imports
(or reduce amount of energy available for export),
acting as a drain on foreign exchange earnings
Subsidies to specific energy technologies act as a
drag on investment in research and
commercialisation of other promising technologies
Subsidies tend to favour large-scale projects at the
expense of small distribution systems, meaning that
the main beneficiaries tend to be urban and wealthy
consumers, rather than the poor”
(source: World Resources Institute)
Figure 8: 2002 Primary Energy Supply 
(renewable energy) 
Source: International Energy Agency
combustible 
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Note: The bars from each country in
figures 7 and 8 add up to the total 100% of
primary energy supply (excluding electricity
trading between countries).  They have
been represented on seperate graphs as the
scale for the renewables energy
percentages is so much smaller than that
for fossil fuels and nuclear power.
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subsidising the climate crisis
energy efficiently. What's more, they often bring
few benefits to the people for whom they are
intended. Reforming energy subsidies must,
therefore, be a central plank of government
efforts to promote sustainable energy systems.”11
In March 2005, the Institute for Public Policy
Research released a study calling on the G8 to end
fossil fuel subsidies as part of its 2005 climate
change agenda, with its author commenting that,
“It is time for governments to put a stop to the
multi-billion dollar hand-outs given to the fossil
fuel industry. To prevent dangerous climate
change, the playing field urgently needs to be
leveled, so that clean, renewable energy
technologies can compete fairly.”12
Despite the broad body of evidence showing that
fossil fuel subsidies are exacerbating climate
change, in June 2005 a senior British energy official
informed the Financial Times newspaper about a
package of tax-cuts and incentives for large oil
companies on the Gleneagles agenda in order to
stimulate refining capacity and reduce the risk of
shortages.13 Again, the rhetoric of paying urgent
attention to the threats posed by climate change is
at odds with the G8’s ‘business as usual’
commitment to ensuring the expansion of the
carbon economy. 
Hypothetically, removing subsidies and ‘leveling of
this playing field’ is entirely consistent with the
G8’s commitment to free market reform. In
reality, the lack of action on this matter
illustrates the extent of the dependence of global
economic expansionism on access to cheap fossil
fuels. It also exposes the double standards of G8
economic policy, in carefully maintaining
protectionist measures when in the interests of
Northern corporate interests, and stripping them
away if not.
the world bank prototype carbon fund (PCF)
The PCF is a fund invested in by seventeen
companies and six governments and managed
by the World Bank. It became operational in
April 2000, and claims to “pioneer the
market for project-based greenhouse gas
emission reductions while promoting
sustainable development.”1 Such projects are
eligible to earn carbon credits, either as
Joint Implementation in industrialised
countries, or  Clean Development Mechanism
in the Majority World. 
In April 2004, eighty environmental and
social justice groups delivered a letter to
the World Bank calling for the closure of the
fund, condemning it as “destructive
greenwash,” and that instead of solving
problems, it has “exacerbated existing
human rights violations and furthered
environmental destruction.”2
One of the most well publicised and highly
controversial PCF projects is the planting of
23,100 hectares of eucalyptus trees in a rural
area of Minas Gerais in Brazil. The project
claims to reduce emissions by using
eucalyptus trees to make charcoal,
supposedly avoiding a shift to the use of coal
as an energy source, which emits higher level
of CO2. In addition to this, forestry company
Plantar is seeking to gain credit for its
industrial tree plantations it claims act as a
carbon ‘sink’, temporarily storing carbon
which will eventually be released back into
the atmosphere when the trees are cut and
turned into charcoal.
Critics state that the plantations have an
enormous negative impact on biodiversity,
create appalling conditions for the local labour
force (many of whom have been impoverished
after having been evicted from their land to
make way for the plantations), and heavily
pollute and reduce the surrounding water
sources, devastating the livelihoods of farmers
and fisherfolk.3 The Norwegian company that
verifies carbon credit schemes, Det Norske
Veritas, has stated that a lack of clarity on the
rules means they could not guarantee that the
project actually will have a permanent positive
effect on the climate.4
In addition to projects such as Plantar, the
PCF is also funding four large hydro-electric
installations as CDM projects, none of which
have demonstrated compliance with the World
Commission on Dam's criteria and guidelines.
Five out of the G8 countries are donating large
sums of money to the PCF, either as a
government, as in the case of Canada and
Japan (through the governmental institution,
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation),
or through some of the major corporations of
that country. These include BP in Britain, Gaz
de France in France, RWE and Deutsche Bank in
Germany and Chubu Electric Power Co.,
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Mitsubishi Corp.,
MIT Carbon and Tokyo Electric Power Co. in
Japan. As a PCF investor, the company is
eligible for a pro rata share of credits from the
PCF projects. Governments may use these
credits towards their Kyoto targets, while
companies can use them within markets such as
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.
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In 2005 the G8 countries held 48% of the voting
rights within the IMF (see figure 9).14 Created at
the same Bretton Woods Conference that saw the
creation of the World Bank in 1944, it aims to
supply member states with money to help them
overcome short-term balance-of-payments
difficulties. 
Such money is only made available, however, after
the recipients have agreed to neoliberal policy
reforms in their economies - in short, to implement
a Structural Adjustment Programme. Although the
IMF is not an environmental institution, its role in
implementing economic stabilisation and structural
adjustment policies means that it has a major
impact on climate change. 
One of the major goals of the IMF is to pressure
developing countries to generate foreign exchange
through exports. In order to meet the IMF’s
ambitious targets, the country often resorts to over-
exploiting its natural resource base, which could be
composed of fossil fuel deposits. 
In such situations, the imposition of an import-
export model opens up this resource base to foreign
markets with all the ensuing problems that are
examined in the next section in the context of the
World Bank. 
Governments are often instructed by the IMF to
rapidly trim budget deficits, and it is often the
budget that is allocated to environmental regulation
that is seen as being expedient. Decreased spending
weakens government’s ability to enforce
environmental laws and diminishes efforts to promote
measures such as energy efficiency, cutting emissions
and preventing illegal logging. Deforestation and
land-use changes – often resulting from IMF-imposed
Adjustment Programmes – are responsible for at least
20% of annual CO2 emissions.16
Figure 9 - G8 Voting Rights in the World Bank and IMF
Source: World Bank and IMF websites
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Deforestation and land-use
changes – often resulting from IMF-
imposed Adjustment Programmes –
are responsible for at least 20% of
annual CO2 emissions.
The World Bank Group (WBG) is made up of five
agencies that make loans or guarantee credit to its
177 member countries. Apart from financing
projects such as roads, dams and power plants, the
Bank also makes loans to restructure a country's
economic system by funding Structural Adjustment
Programmes. It manages a loan portfolio totalling
$200 billion and in 2004 loaned a record $28.9
billion to over 80 countries.17
The World Bank is one of the major protagonists in
the development of carbon-intensive projects in the
Majority World, and its ‘one dollar, one vote’ voting
system means that the G7 countries directly control
some 46% of the voting rights (see figure 9).18 Each
country has the privilege of electing its own
executive director to sit on the 24-strong board
which makes the decisions on project funding and
thus have enormous influence on the WBG. According
to a report by the Institute for Policy Studies of
World Bank lending over the decade from 1994 to
2003, it approved over $24.8 billion in financing for
fossil fuel extraction and power projects while in the
same period just $1.06 billion went to renewable
energy projects – a ratio of 23-1.19 A large part of
the investment in fossil-fuel extraction flows straight
back to the West. As much as 82% of oil projects that
the WBG invested in since 1992 were aimed towards
export back to the West, according to a study by the
Sustainable Energy and Economy Network, effectively
resulting in a fossil-fuel subsidy to the West under
the guise of ‘development’.20
Behind the statistics of dollars and tonnes, are
countless stories of people whose day-to-day lives
have been impacted by these projects. The WBG
has faced a barrage of criticism for their projects
involving a variety of human rights abuses, large
scale displacement of local populations and
inadequate environmental regulation.21 One recent
WBG funded project that has proved controversial
for these reasons is the Chad-Cameroon Oil
Pipeline, where “thousands of people have had
their lands expropriated, crops and other plants
destroyed and water sources polluted without
adequate compensation. Some victims received no
compensation at all, as in the case of the Bakola
and Bagyeli (‘pygmees’) in the forest zone in
Cameroon.”22 Another example is BP’s Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline, which will create a thousand mile
militarised corridor through or near seven different
conflict zones and three countries with very poor
human rights records. The project, which has
required the confiscation of people’s land and
which is causing economic and physical disruption
to hundreds of communities along the route is
carrying oil destined solely for the West, with no
alleviation of the fuel-poverty of the region.23
During the World Bank meeting in Prague 2000, in
the face of mounting international criticism and a
global PR crisis, then President, James Wolfensohn
initiated the Extractive Industries Review, which
pledged to evaluate the poverty alleviation impacts
of the Bank’s involvement in fossil fuel extraction in
the Majority World. The Bank appointed Dr. Emil
Salim, the former Indonesian Environment Minister
under Suharto and a Director of Indonesia's largest
coal company to direct the review, which was
eventually released at the end of 2003. The report
was strongly critical of the Bank’s record in terms
of development, human rights and the environment
and concluded that there was little connection
between the Bank’s primary aims of poverty
reduction and sustainable development and its
support for the extractive industries sector. It
recommended that the Bank adopt significant
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“ . . . . [ the Wor ld  Bank]  over  the decade
from 1994 to  2003. . .  approved over
$24.8 b i l l ion in  f inancing for  foss i l  fue l
ext ract ion and power  pro jects  whi le  in
the same per iod just  $1.06 b i l l ion went
to  renewable energy pro jects . ”the world bank
image by quinder
reforms, including doing more to reduce poverty,
immediately ceasing funding for coal projects
worldwide and phasing out its support for oil
production by 2008.24
Despite the findings of the report and the fact
that in October of 2001, James Bond, then the
head of the World Bank's mining department,
pledged on behalf of James Wolfensohn that “if
the review determines that certain policies or
programs have detracted from our goal of poverty
reduction, we are committed to implementing
changes to redress those problems,”25 very little
seems to have changed. When the Bank's Board of
Directors finally discussed the report in August
2004, they endoresed some token commitments to
change. For example, while they pledged to
increase renewable energy financing by 20%
annually, this increase was calculated using a
baseline that was so low that the target for
renewable energy support in 2005 was lower than
the loans for renewable energy in 1994.26
EBRD: fuelling the industry
Numerous initiatives have also been launched by the
world’s regional development banks such as the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) which is in the final stages of setting up its
Multilateral Carbon Credit Fund (MCCF). The Fund is
expected to provide $50-150 million of financing for
carbon offset schemes in Central & Eastern Europe
and the Former Soviet Union. The move comes at a
time when the EBRD has been under severe criticism
for its financing of fossil-fuel and nuclear projects
in the region, including the controversial BP-backed
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and Shell’s Sakhalin-II
pipeline in Russia. According to Friends of the
Earth, the EBRD has provided $1.8 billion in
financing for oil and gas projects since 1993
representing a massive amount of greenhouse gas
emissions.27 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline alone
is expected to contribute to 160 million tons of
carbon dioxide per year – nearly 30% of the UK’s
total annual greenhouse gas emissions alone.28
The EBRD primarily supports private sector
initiatives and it’s carbon fund is no different. Jan-
Willem van de Ven from the bank’s Energy
Efficiency Department admits that the EBRD intends
to use the fund to “significantly expand the
presence of the carbon market’s private sector in
the region.”29 In a letter to CEE Bankwatch,
defending its environment record, the EBRD
complains that it cannot achieve better results on
its environmental programs due to “the slow
process of privatization” in much of the region.30
IDB: a thirst for dams
A large part of the Inter-American Bank for
Development (IDB) mandate involves easing the
passage of neoliberal agreements in the region
including the DR-CAFTA that creates a free trade
zone between six countries in the Central America
and the Dominican Republic. The bank advises
policy-makers on developing “national and regional
strategies for a competitive transition of agriculture
and the rural economy of Central American
countries in light of further trade liberalization.” It
also employs strategies similar to controversial
structural adjustment policies by, for example,
instructing impoverished countries such as
Nicaragua to “rationalize public spending”.31
The IDB has also been expanding its lending in Latin
America for carbon offset projects under the aegis
of the CDM. In tandem with the World Bank’s
Prototype Carbon Fund, the IDB has been
particularly focused on providing financing for a
number of controversial hydroelectric projects in
the region, claiming that the projects meet
sustainable development goals. The IDB’s financing
of huge infrastructural projects in the region such
as medium and large-scale hydroelectric dams has
provoked much unease among local communities.
Just recently, a group of 300 people occupied the
offices of the IDB in Brazil in anger at its role in
financing two dams in the North of the country.32
Approximately 30% of the emission reductions
purchased through the Prototype Carbon Fund are
from Latin American and Caribbean nations over
which the IDB carries significant leverage.33 The
allure of carbon investment by such funds combined
with general pressure to open markets has provoked
some governments in the region to liberalise
investment in their energy sectors. For example,
the IDB has been increasingly promoting private
sector involvement in the development of small and
medium-sized dams with the interests of leveraging
carbon financing for them. In response, the
Government of Mexico recently eased restrictions
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regional banks
on corporate investments in small and
medium-scale hydropower projects under
pressure from the IDB. For the first time in
the country, private hydroelectric plants
will operate and sell energy they produce to
industry and municipalities for self-
consumption and export. The Mexican
government “gave the green light to
construct these types of medium-scale
plants and offered concessions for canals
and dams so that the private sector can
operate.”34 As one IDB economist observed
ominously, “The Clean Development
Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol may well
enlarge the list of hydro projects that could
be competitive in the new energy markets
of the LAC [Latin American and Caribbean]
region.”35
The role of the CDM in the financing of dams
is a symptom of the trend to constrain
environmental problem-solving within
parameters set by free-market economic
policy. In the context of the parallel
economic forces at work in DR-CAFTA and
the controversial Plan Pueblo Panama (PPP)
and Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA) negotiations, Kyoto and aspirations
to avert climate change become subsumed
and reshaped to reflect business-as-usual.
This is a common occurrence when
environmental policy enters the orbit of the
free market.
likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
In February 2005, the Italian Minister for the Economy, Domenico
Siniscalco admitted that it was going to be a struggle for Italy to
achieve its 6.5% reduction target, given the fact that in 2002,
emissions levels were 8.8% higher than 1990 levels. The Minister
concluded that domestic cuts would not be enough and that Italy
would have to resort to the use of flexible mechanisms. In the
same statement, Siniscalco disputed the legally binding nature of
the Protocol, saying that “Kyoto coming into force is not ... a law
but a process, a direction in which we are walking,” and that “It
is not that we should take these targets too literally.”1
emissions trading
In May 2005, the  EC accepted Italy's long overdue NAP for the
2005-2007 trading period, after the Italian authorities agreed to
lower significantly the total number of allocation by 23 million
tonnes of CO2 annually or 9%, enabling its delayed entry into the
EU-ETS. The revised NAP is for an annual average of 232.5 million
tonnes of CO2 over the initial trading phase, which accounts for
4.1% of the total allocations amongst the 25 EU countries.2 The
added cut in the Italian plan helped send European CO2 prices to
a new high, at 19 per tonne emitted.
Italy has already established the World Bank-administrated Italian
Carbon Fund with an initial endowment of $15 million, with
contracts for projects to allegedly reduce emissions by several
million tonnes already contracted. It has also invested in a
number of other World Bank managed carbon funds, namely the
Prototype Carbon Fund, the BioCarbon Fund and the Community
Development Carbon Fund.3
Figure 10 Source: International Energy Agency 
country profile: italy
28
“In the new era of scarce sky, there will, of
necessity, be an economy of sky. Property rights
will be established, prices will be charged, and
money will change hands. A lot of money. As a
result of the current global warming crisis, the
establishment of these new property rights will
occur soon. Owners of sky will collect rent that
will flow back into the economy, just as land rent
does now.”
Peter Barnes and Rafe Pomerance,
'Pie in the Sky', 20001
A number of economists, agencies and NGOs have
been working for some years now to promote the
use of market forces to solve environmental
problems. By assigning a price to nature’s
‘services’, such as the earth's ability to absorb
greenhouse gases, proponents believe that
markets will begin to internalise this information
in language familiar to commodities brokers in
the world’s financial centres. This can be seen
most clearly within the climate change debate
where enormous amounts of time and energy have
been devoted by business groups, NGOs, emissions
brokers, government and UN agencies on affixing
a price to the world’s foremost greenhouse gas -
carbon dioxide. “We are now living in a new
world where carbon has a price...,” says one NGO
supporter of market-based solutions to climate
change.2 Another conservationist asserts that “we
[environmental NGOs] can change them [polluting
companies] by giving them the right incentives by
putting a price to carbon.”3 The Economist
magazine recently reiterated its support for such
market-based environmentalism adding its hope
that, “perhaps soon, the best things in life will
not be free.”4
It has long been recognised that the economy
tends to ignore5 the environmental ‘externalities’
“The world is not made by specialists. There
are people in the lands who know what they
want and you do not hear them. And that's the
important thing - to hear those people's
ideas.”
Daniella Meireles, Brazilian forest activist
part 4
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(such as the cost of cleaning up pollution)
associated with the production and consumption
of goods and services.6 Some argue that markets
need to factor in the real monetary costs to such
things as air pollution and oil spills in order to
change corporate and consumer behaviour
towards more sustainable activities.7 While some
environmentalists view any discussion of
externalities and environmental costs to be
largely a tactical one (so as to be able to
highlight inequities in the economic system),8
there are those who believe that the spreadsheet
is the best weapon in the fight to save people and
planet.9 The latter view is shared by the likes of
the US-based Competitive Enterprise Institute, a
free-market think-tank, which prefers to see the
problem of externalities “as a failure to permit
markets and create markets where they do not
yet - or no longer - exist.”10
Pro-market rhetoric has become increasingly
commonplace in environmental policy circles with
strong ideological backing from agencies such as
the World Bank and the UN Environment
Programme as well as groups such as the World
Resources Institute, IUCN-World Conservation
Union, and the Ford Foundation.11 But the shift in
language accompanied action. By the early 1990s
they began to seriously examine the question:
“What are Mother Nature's life-support services
worth?”12 In an effort to formulate an answer, a
number of economic models and tools for
assessing the value of earth’s ‘natural capital'
have been devised and have influenced the
development of key reports such as the UN
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment13 which
Secretary-General Kofi Annan praised for setting-
out “common-sense strategies” for preserving
“natural capital for development.”14 The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment itself is littered
with such language and makes a number of
recommendations for market-based ‘solutions’ to
environmental problems such as various forms of
emissions trading for land, air and water pollution
as well as full pricing of ‘ecosystem services’.15
“While some functions of nature will always
struggle to be reflected in markets, new
opportunities are emerging to put a price on
services previously assumed to be free.”16
Such inventories of natures ‘assets’ have also
gone hand-in-hand with elaborate proposals and
concerted (and largely successful) efforts by
corporate lobby groups and think-tanks to remove
or ‘structurally adjust’ environmental regulations
and install free-market policies in their stead.17
Terry Anderson, a neoliberal economist and co-
author of the 1991 book ‘Free Market
Environmentalism’ describes how attitudes in the
US Government have changed over the years:
“One example of how the rhetoric in resource
management has shifted because of FME's
influence is that years ago I was invited to speak
in front of the Bureau of Reclamation of the
Department of the Interior. The commissioner of
the bureau burst out, ‘I’ve had enough of you
kiddie-car economists telling me what to do!’ He
was afraid to discuss even the possibility of
markets working. But, recently, I was invited back
to the bureau to discuss how the Department of
the Interior might privatize water projects, which
shows how the debate has shifted in favour of
market solutions. The environmental community
in general has embraced market approaches; from
as far away as Africa, almost everybody is at least
considering market solutions.”18 
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Many of the underpinnings of this discourse can
be traced back to the work of neo-Malthusians19
in the post-WWII years who drew upon Thomas
Malthus' brutal ideas about economics and
population to champion an environmental case for
enclosure and commodification of natural
resources.20 Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834)
was an English clergyman and economist who
posited a number of controversial theories about
population dynamics, labour relations, class,
poverty and sexual relations which continue to
have an impact to this day. He advocated
privatisation and the dismantling of commons
management systems as a way to restore ‘nature’s
equilibrium’ and advanced policies that
institutionalised misogyny, social exclusion, and
helped undermine many of the progressive
developments of his time. He challenged the
notion of economic or social justice arguing that
inequality was a natural phenomenon.21 “A man
who is born into a world already possessed, if he
cannot get subsistence from his parents, and if
the society do not want his labour, has no claim
of right to the smallest portion of food. At
nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for
him. She tells him to be gone.”22 
Many years later, at the height of the Cold War,23
US biologist and eugenicist, Garrett Hardin,
expanded on Malthus's theories by championing
privatisation as the most effective means to
preserve nature against the ‘threat’ posed by
‘overpopulation’. “The pollution problem is a
consequence of population,” which he says calls
“for a redefinition of property rights.”24
According to Hardin, the struggle for freedom and
justice should be anathema to the environmental
movement.25 Pursue “complete justice” and bring
upon the world “complete catastrophe.”26 The
ideological underpinnings for such schemes as
emissions trading ride in the wagon-wheel ruts of
his neo-Malthusian advocacy. “Effective demand
can be reduced by converting community property
into saleable private property, which is then sold
by auction.”27 His essay, The Tragedy of the
Commons, continues to serve as a rallying-cry for
free-market environmentalists and neo-
Malthusians to this day.28 Its racist undertones
can sometimes be heard in the climate debate
when privileged groups in the North drum-up
fears about the fossil-fuel consumption of
populous countries such as China29 as a way to
shift the emphasis away from their own over-
consumption. As US academic Betsy Hartman
paraphrases, “better the one child family over
there than a one car policy here...”30
Malthus and Hardin have many contemporaries.
London School of Economics professor John Gray
rejects the notion that economic policies are to
blame for environmental degradation. “The
destruction of the natural world is not the result
of global capitalism, industrialisation, ‘western
civilisation’ or any flaw in human institutions. It
is a consequence of the evolutionary success of
an exceptionally rapacious primate.”31 Mark
Lynas, author of High Tide: How Climate Crisis is
Engulfing Our Planet, virtually channels Malthus
in an article in which he likens humans to
“cockroaches” and is appalled that “this species
has been reproducing at bacterial levels.”32
Writing as a “former left-winger”, Lynas chastises
leftists for “neglecting ecological concerns in
favour of their enduring obsession: human
equality.”33
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dubious origins: the legacy of Malthus
Over the last few decades, economic policy and
public attitudes towards government and the
economy have been influenced by the
development of what has come to be known as
‘neoliberalism’.34 In short, neoliberalism de-
emphasises the role of government in managing
the economy (or the climate for that matter) in
favour of the market and the private sector. It
encompasses the basic elements of classical free
market theory but extends further into areas such
as its promotion and protection of intellectual
property rights and enclosure, unbridled
corporate power, and its reliance upon strong
supra-national institutions to ‘govern’ the global
economy such as the World Bank, the IMF, the
World Trade Organisation, various UN agencies
and the G8.35 This last means that it would be
wrong to characterise neoliberalism in terms of
strict ‘deregulation’ since, paradoxically, it
requires strong regulatory frameworks that
operate in the interests of maintaining ‘free’
markets and trade. It would therefore be more
appropriate to talk about it exemplifying a ‘re-
regulation’ agenda, one in which rules are
changed to restrain the activities of governments
rather than those of corporations. Former US
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor put it
succinctly when he remarked: “I don't believe in
free trade. There is no such thing. We want rules-
based trading systems, not free trade. Free trade
is chaotic. I don't know anybody that wants free
trade.”36
Where neo-Malthusianism helps to undermine
sophisticated commons patterns37 for managing
natural resource use and creates new property
rights for 'environmental markets', neoliberalism
ensures that governments and state actors are
prevented from interfering with such markets.
Government regulations, such as the imposition of
pollution controls, are treated as barriers to
'efficient' environmental policy. “We have reached
the limits of centralized environmental
regulation. Indeed, in some cases we have already
surpassed those limits and environmental
programs themselves stand as the greatest
obstacles to continued cleanup and
conservation,” writes Jonathan H Adler in the
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.38 Lynn
Scarlett, one of the architects of US President
George W Bush's ‘new environmentalism’ policy
doctrine agrees, affirming her belief that free-
market theorist “Adam Smith's invisible hand has
a green thumb.”39 This sunny optimism in the
market's ability to deliver ecological
“The disastrous road to serfdom
can just as easily be paved with
green bricks as with red ones.” 
Competitive Enterprise Institute
US-based free-market think-tank
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paradigms lost: the greening of neoliberalism 
improvements is often accompanied by a visceral
reaction by free-market environmentalists
towards any but the most narrowly-defined form
of regulation. Take, for instance, the US-based
Competitive Enterprise Institute which lumps
environmental regulation of markets in the same
category as medieval oppression: “The disastrous
road to serfdom can just as easily be paved with
green bricks as with red ones.”40
As neoliberal ideas continue to gain currency, the
pressure on government regulatory agencies such
as environment ministries to cease-and-desist
from interfering with markets has been mounting.
In the G8 countries this trend has been spurred on
by the aggressive campaigns of corporate lobby
groups and alliances which have been aided by
restructuring agreements, for example in the EU
where the 1997 EU Single Market Action Plan and
the 2000 ‘Lisbon Process’ were both heavily
influenced by the recommendations of Europe's
most powerful transnational corporations.41 These
agreements entail, in the words of Amsterdam-
based Corporate Europe Observatory, nothing less
than a “sweeping neoliberal restructuring of
European societies.”42 Baron Daniel Janssen of
chemical giant Solvay and member of the
Brussels-based lobby group, the European
Roundtable of Industrialists, describes this
corporate-led restructuring process as a “double
revolution” in which corporations and market
forces are successfully “reducing the power of
the state and of the public sector in general
through privatisation and deregulation” on the
one hand, and “transferring many of the nation-
states' powers to a more modern and internation-
ally minded structure at the European level.”43
This ‘double revolution’ is also taking place at
the national level in Europe, with the UK and the
Netherlands taking the lead in implementing
regulatory ‘modernisation programmes’ and
market experiments. In March 2005, for example,
Gordon Brown, the UK Chancellor of the
Exchequer, together with Prime Minister Tony
Blair, announced a set of radical reforms aimed at
“reducing the burden of regulation on business."44
The British reform agenda was assisted directly by
business leaders such as mobile-phone operator
O2’s David Arculus and supermarket chain
Sainsbury's Phillip Hampton.45 David Arculus has
since been selected to become the new head of
the Confederation of British Industry, the UK's
most powerful corporate lobby group. Both
business leaders produced influential reports
recommending much more relaxed regulatory
attitudes towards business and radical changes
made to the way Government legislates.  
risky business
The recommendations were well received by
Prime Minister Blair46 who subsequently called for
a drive to reduce regulation by implementing a
‘risk-based approach’, where only the most
vaguely-defined ‘risky’ activities would fall under
regulatory scrutiny. Meanwhile the majority of
business operations will receive “not just a light
but a limited touch,” according to Gordon
Brown.47 “This risk-based approach will help move
us a million miles away from the old belief that
business, unregulated, will invariably act
irresponsibly,” he added.48
But such sweeping reforms to state regulatory
controls are themselves risky. As Environment
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Data Services (ENDS) reports, the kind of
regulatory inspections that the Environment
Agency (the largest Government regulator and
most criticised by business49) has now committed
to do away with, “revealed almost 40 breaches of
emissions limits at 23 sites” in 2004. This
amounted to almost 20% of the total number of
all on-site inspections for that year.50 ENDS cite
the example of the chemical company Sevalco, a
member of the chemical industry's voluntary
‘Responsible Care’ initiative, that was fined
$450,000 in 2004 for “excessive discharges of
cyanide into the Severn Estuary”.51 Inspectors
found that “for over four years, senior staff
falsified monitoring records to conceal the
breaches.”52
in the absence of oversight
Despite this, the new Government reform agenda
as articulated in the Hampton Report, demands
that “there should be no inspection of business
without a reason,”53 preferring to rely on industry
self-monitoring and voluntary reporting.54
Corporate groups have also demanded the
creation of a cabinet-level body to enforce this
new deregulatory culture in Government and
“throw out proposals likely to have a major
impact on business that do not pass these key
tests of quality.”55 Similar reforms are taking
place in many of the G8 countries and Tony Blair
has announced that he will use the UK's
Presidency of the EU to advance some of these
sweeping structural adjustments on the EU as a
whole in the coming months.56
The implications of this unprecedented corporate-
driven “red-tape revolution”57 are devastating.
Corporate polluters have already been operating
with virtual impunity as Government inspections
of polluting sites have nearly halved since 1998,
while visits to waste management sites have
dropped by a third over the same period.58 With
the introduction of various 'market-based'
schemes to managing pollution levels, the
situation becomes even more precarious, as the
lack of effective Government oversight over
polluting sources means that the whole system
increasingly relies upon the goodwill of
corporations to report their emissions honestly. 
Commenting on the state of emissions trading
markets generally, Ron Southern, CEO of Canadian
Utilities Ltd which owns the ATCO Group of power
companies, believes “people with duplicitous
intentions will find ways on either the supply or
the buying side to do things which on the surface
may seem proper and appropriate... It’s naive to
think everybody involved will act within the
intent of the legislation.”59
The success of the corporate lobby campaign to
weaken environmental protection provisions in
the name of competitiveness and the greater
possibilities for fraud and malfeasance it affords,
calls into question some of the basic foundations
of the new ‘environmental markets’ paradigm and
its capacity to solve such urgent issues as climate
change. The effects of these ‘reforms’ will be
difficult to roll-back, and the impacts will likely
be felt for generations to come if the elevated
role of corporations over institutions governing
the global economy continues unchecked. 
“As intended, all this [cost-benefit analysis]
sounds professional and innocent. In reality
it is a velvet glove for the iron fisted
insistence on business-as-usual.”
Global Commons Institute
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In justifying his support for a ‘risk-based’
approach to regulation, Prime Minister Blair
refers to the need to recognize that “there are
trade-offs, dilemmas, balances between costs and
benefits in every decision.”60 But reducing debate
about issues such as climate change to a question
of costs and benefits can be a dangerous and
ultimately self-defeating strategy. Take for
example, Danish statistician Bjorn Lomborg's
assertion that the possible benefits of minimising
climate change can lead to an “aggregate $5
trillion benefit” globally, but then goes on to
suggest that the cost of controlling global
warming could run “from $3 to $33 trillion.”61 As
a result, Lomborg concludes, “the money would
be better spent elsewhere.”62 Lomborg's
‘sceptical environmentalism’, has been warmly
embraced by neoliberal think-tanks and their
mouthpieces such as The Economist magazine not
least because it drew upon the seductive
language of cost-benefit analysis to claim to
portray the “real state of the world”.63
Lomborg’s assessment that the costs outweighed
the benefits with respect to climate change
provided ammunition to those who preferred to
bury their heads in the sand. The Economist
magazine seized on the news and was quick to
admonish “green scare-mongers and their
credulous servants in the media,” for stirring up
public concerns about global warming.64 Time
magazine named him one of the 100 most
influential people in 2004.65 The secret to his
success has been to confine the parameters of
what should be a political debate to a question of
numbers. Regardless of their accuracy or
relevance, numerical arguments have long had the
power to seduce. They carry with them an air of
indisputability. The pressure was now on to
‘rationalise’ efforts to avert catastrophic climate
change on the basis of cost-benefit arguments.66
Lomborg railed against the hundreds of scientists
and experts who make up the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for their decision
not to rely on his methods in their influential
assessments: “A political decision stopped the
IPCC from looking at the total cost-benefit of
global warming.”67 
murder by numbers
Ironically the IPCC did flirt with a shameful piece
of cost-benefit illusion when it suggested that
rich people were worth more than poor people
when calculating the human cost of climate
change.68 The 1995 study by researchers at the
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the
Global Environment (CSERGE), University College
London, evaluated the cost of human lives lost
due to climate change by estimating how much
people would pay for adaptive measures that
prevent death.69 By using such a methodology,
inevitably, those from the affluent North could
pay more than those in poorer countries, (in some
cases by a factor of 15 to 1). Their final
conclusion was that the costs of climate change,
in terms of human lives, was higher in the North
than in the Majority World. In one paper produced
by CSERGE, the dollar value of a ‘statistical life’
in the North was assessed as being approximately
$1,500,000 per head, while in countries such as
China, it was only $150,000.70
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The IPCC was eventually forced to publish a
summary opposing the findings within the same
report due to the massive controversy that
ensued. Nonetheless, the results from the original
cost-benefit analysis remained in the report,
prompting the Global Commons Institute to decry
it as an “economics of genocide”. They added:
“As intended, all this [cost-benefit analysis]
sounds professional and innocent. But it is
conceptually skewed, factually inaccurate and
politically devious. In reality it is a velvet glove
for the iron fisted insistence on business-as-
usual.”71
Rattling the abacus against such vastly complex
issues as climate change is ultimately a futile
exercise. As many of the IPCC scientists already
acknowledge in their assessments, the anticipated
effects of climate change go well beyond the
calculable. Cost-benefit analysis can not properly
account for effects such as that of human lives
lost, species extinction, and massive social
changes. As Tom Burke of Imperial College,
London observes, “The reality is that applying
cost-benefit analysis to questions such as these
[climate change] is junk economics... It is a
vanity of economists to believe that all choices
can be boiled down to calculations of monetary
value.”72 US academic David M Driesen agrees,
arguing that “regulators must see themselves not
as balancers of costs and benefits, but as
catalysts for change.”73
But the calculus of climate change has its fan-
base in government departments and policy
committees, corporate boardrooms, consultancies
and UN agencies. Many government programmes
and environmental impact assessments are now
required to perform cost-benefit analyses as a
matter of course. For instance, the European
Commission's Clean Air for Europe Programme
(CAFE) which aims to “protect against significant
negative effects of air pollution on human health
and the environment.”74 The programme will form
the basis of EU policy on air pollution for years to
come.75 However the analysis excludes a number
of externalities associated with air pollution
including impacts on ecosystems and cultural
heritage, arguing that “inclusion of these effects
would further increase the results.”76 In other
words, if these factors were included, the social
and environmental costs of air pollution by, for
example, coal-fired power stations, would be
deemed too high for the industry to be allowed to
continue operating them. 
It is here where the alchemy of cost-benefit kicks
in and the underlying politics of the exercise can
sometimes be glimpsed. When something cannot
be reliably calculated in monetary terms, such as
mortality rates, instead of casting doubt on the
accuracy of the cost-benefit analysis, the
offending incalculable item is ignored. For
example, the CAFE analysis lists a whole host of
potential impacts it ignores from its assessment,
such as effects on water quality and biodiversity
as well as mortality rates, due to ‘limited data
availability’.77 Nonetheless the final flawed
analysis is being used by the European
Commission to calculate the costs of its air
pollution policies such as the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme and will inform official EU
decision-making on air pollution for the
foreseeable future. 
36
“The world may yet leapfrog from the dark
ages of clumsy, costly, command-and-control
regulations to an enlightened age of informed,
innovative, incentive-based greenery.” 
The Economist magazine
In returning back to the question of assigning a
‘price’ to carbon, it is important to consider how
engaging in cost-benefit analysis reduces critical
debate about complex issues such as climate
change down to a discussion about numbers and
fixed absolutes. It is a line of argument that
economists and business leaders are far better
equipped to deal with on terms eminently more
favourable to them.78 Some climate activists
attempt to play along, restricting themselves to
technocratic lines of argument about emission
caps and quotas, market data, allocation units
and financial mechanisms, but as Larry Lohmann
from The Corner House observes: “From a tactical
point of view, the notion that people in power
can be ‘reached’ by cost-benefit analysis just
because it is phrased in a numerical 'language
they can understand' and uses the word 'dollars' is
childish. As John Adams notes, ‘treasuries and big
business are better equipped than most to notice
when someone is speaking nonsense in their own
language’.”79
Combined with a political bias among many
decision-makers and global economic institutions
towards a neoliberal worldview - one in which
markets are considered to be the most ‘efficient’
forums for managing scarce resources – the effect
is to drastically narrow the parameters of debate
and points of common reference. Thus, in the
case of climate change, the debate gravitates
towards price forecasts and carbon derivatives
rather than a more all-encompassing political
discussion where issues such as democracy,
justice, equity and ecological integrity can come
to the fore. As one WWF campaigner admits, “we
are talking about transforming a market.”80
The climate talks have been reduced to a
numbers game and those disempowered by the
lexicon of free-market environmentalism and
cost-benefit analysis end up short. The Economist
magazine editors applaud this trend: “Whether
the big environmental groups join or not, the
next green revolution is already under way.
Rachel Carson, the crusading journalist who
inspired greens in the 1950s and 60s, is joining
hands with Adam Smith, the hero of free-
marketeers. The world may yet leapfrog from the
dark ages of clumsy, costly, command-and-control
regulations to an enlightened age of informed,
innovative, incentive-based greenery.”81
The problem is a systemic one. The political
culture of international policy-making often
proceeds from the same basic starting points.
Assumptions about common terms of reference,
language, ‘stakeholder’ identification and aims
are made and develop a momentum and culture
all their own. As a result, one is unlikely to hear
the words ‘justice’ or ‘democracy’ in the meeting
rooms of the official climate talks, but
‘competitiveness’, ‘economic growth’, and the
full nomenclature of the market are regularly
bandied about. This deep cultural and political
bias is reflected in the outcomes of these
deliberations. Outcomes so market-based in
orientation that Aaron Cosbey from the UK-based
Royal Institute for International Affairs suggests
that, “the Kyoto Protocol and the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) may be the
most important economic agreement penned in
the 20th century.”82
a question of tactics
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country profile: britain
likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
The replacement in the early 1990s of polluting
coal-fired power stations with cleaner gas plants,
meant that up until 2000 it appeared that Britain
was well on its way to achieving its Kyoto
commitment of reducing its GHG emissions by
12.5% below 1990 levels. However consecutive
increases in CO2 output in 2003 and 2004 now mean
that it is uncertain whether or not the target will
be met. Although the latest projections from
Friends of the Earth put Britain at 12.6% below
1990 levels in 2004, they no longer have another
CO2 ‘windfall’ like the ‘dash for gas’ of the 1990s,
and they will find it very hard to keep this figure
below the target level in the coming years.
emissions trading
The original NAP submitted by Britain in April 2004
allocated 736 million tonnes of CO2 for British
industry to emit during the first trading period
(13.2% of the total EU allocations1), and was
accepted by the EC in July of the same year.
However in October Britain claimed that it had
miscalculated and submitted a revised version
which brought the UK total up to 756 million
tonnes, which was rejected by the Commission. In
March 2005, Britain said that it would go ahead
with the original NAP allocation to enable
companies to start trading on the market, but that
it was simultaneously initiating a legal challenge in
the European Court of Justice. Like the other G8
leaders who submitted NAPs, Prime Minister Blair
was widely criticised by both environmental groups
and actors within the emissions market for over-
allocating permits.
Britain also pioneered the world's first national
GHG emissions trading scheme, which was launched
in March 2002. The scheme is due to run until 2006,
with thirty one ‘direct participants’ involved who
have an absolute cap on emissions against 1998-
2000 levels, as well as 6,000 companies eligible to
take part.2
Labour MP Gerry Steinberg, a member of the House
of Commons Public Accounts Committee, described
the scheme as a “mockery” and “outrageous waste
of public money,” following an investigation of the
scheme by the National Audit Office. Over-generous
baselines meant that four companies massively over
complied in the first year of the scheme. The fact
that their GHG emissions were already controlled
under other environmental regulations lead Edward
Leigh, the Conservative chair of the committee to
observe that the scheme “seems to be paying
[Ineos Fluor, Invista, BP and Rhodia] $190 million
for keeping emissions down to levels they had
already achieved before they joined.”3
Figure 11  Source: International Energy Agency
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likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
As of May 2005, Canada has increased its GHG
emissions by 22.6% above 1990 levels when, under
Kyoto, it is supposed to be achieving a reduction of
6% by 2012. It seems highly unlikely that this target
will be achieved through purely domestic measures.
The Canadian government has been reluctant to
legislate reduction targets for Large Final Emitters
(industry and energy generators), refused to legislate
emissions standards for automobiles, and continues
to subsidise the exploration and development of oil
and gas reserves. Canada has admitted that it will
need to purchase emissions credits from other
countries in order to meet its Kyoto target.1
emissions trading
Unlike its southern neighbour, Canada has very little
experience with domestic emissions trading policies,
having conducted only two small pilot projects in
British Columbia and Ontario during the late 1990s. In
2003, Canada invested $12 million to the World Bank
Prototype Carbon Fund, has also invested in the World
Bank BioCarbon fund and looks poised to make more
such investments in the future. In April 2005, Canada
released its $8 billion plan to reach its Kyoto Protocol
targets, named Project Green, $4 billion of which is
going into the Climate Fund. This is intended to help
stakeholders meet their targets and to purchase
international emissions credits.2 It is unclear as to
what percentage of its emissions reductions Canada
plans to meet through international emissions trading
and CDM and JI projects, but it is rather telling that
up to half of the money allocated to meeting the
Kyoto targets is available for this.
energy subsidies
Canada has a long history of subsidising the energy
sector, with the oil, gas and nuclear industries being
the largest benefactors. In 2002, the Government
spent $1.3 billion on oil and gas taxation
expenditures (non-direct subsidies in the form of tax
breaks), and at least $160 million more in direct
subsidies and programme expenditures.3 Since 1970 it
is estimated that the it has provided over $53 billion
in direct subsidies, program spending, and tax
expenditures on the fossil fuel industry (oil, natural
gas, and coal).4 In addition, the Government spent
$168.5 million on direct subsidies in 2002 on Atomic
Energy of Canada Limited (AECL); the corporation
that designs and markets CANDU reactors, and
conducts other nuclear-related activities. In the last
50 years AECL has received $14 billion in direct
subsidies.5 In comparison, Canada spends less than
$24 million per year on renewable energy ($10.3
million of that as research and development) though
it has committed to a $202 million program to
encourage wind energy production.6 
country profile: canada
Figure 12  Source: International Energy Agency
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likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
According to Japan's Global Warming Prevention
Headquarters, GHG emissions in the country during
2002 actually increased 2.2% from the previous
year, when they are supposed to be moving towards
a cut of 6% below 1990 levels under Kyoto. Instead,
however in 2002 its emissions stood at 12.1% above
the 1990 baseline. One of the major reasons for the
year-on-year increase was the temporary closure of
nuclear power plants stemming from the revelation
that utility operators had submitted false reports
regarding their safety. As a result, electric power
companies had to increase output from fossil-fuel-
powered plants to make up the shortfall in energy
requirements. However, this was not the sole
factor. The industrial sector, which includes the
manufacturing and mining industries, increased
output in step with the country’s economic
recovery. Maintaining this growth while making the
necessary emissions cuts will be a substantial
challenge, and one which the current policy
response might not be capable of meeting. 
emissions trading
Japan has the highest number of corporate
contributors to the World Bank Prototype Carbon
Fund, with 8 out of the 17 corporate investors being
Japanese corporations, as well as the Government’s
own Japan Bank for International Cooperation. In
March 2005, the Government announced that it will
spend roughly two years studying potential domestic
emissions trading systems before deciding whether
to introduce them when it reviews its GHG
reduction-target plan in 2007. However, officials
claim that the industrial sectors remain “adamantly
opposed” to emissions trading, arguing that they
would dampen corporate activity and reduce
competitiveness.2 Industry groups argue that Japan
is unlike Europe where cheap reduction options
exist within the region. In a Japanese emissions
market, it is thought that most of the actors would
be buyers rather than sellers, which would drive up
the price of permits and make it very expensive for
emitters to achieve their targets.
energy subsidies
Japan is almost completely dependent on imported
fuel, which makes its energy prices among the
highest in the world. In response, the Government
has worked for a decade to build up its renewable
energy resources, giving some $25 million annually
to solar R&D alone.3 Through generous subsidies
solar-powered houses are common and the country
dominates the global photovoltaic market.
However the nuclear industry, in the absence of
competition from any domestic fossil-fuel
production, receives a great deal of support from
the Government. Despite a current wave of
unpopularity following a string of incidents in
nuclear facilities in Japan (including one involving
the doctoring of plant-safety records), the
Government budget for renewable energy subsidies
at the turn of the century was less than 1% of that
for nuclear power.4
The Government also offers ‘grants’ to local
communities willing to host nuclear facilities.5
country profile: japan
Figure 13  Source: International Energy Agency
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“Investment is a desirable and desired thing...
Nonetheless, governments still sometimes find it
threatening, because free direct investment
limits administrations' ability to control and
shape their countries' economic destiny. This is a
small price to pay for allowing private sector
decision-makers to generate economic benefits
worldwide. But it is a price that some
governments in some sectors still find difficult to
pay. That is a tragedy.”
Sir Leon Brittan, former EU Trade Commissioner.1
While free trade in goods continues to remain a
hot topic of international political efforts, there
is a widely held view that the ‘cutting-edge’
issues for neoliberal policy-makers lie in the
fields of investment and services which make up
the bulk of global economic activity. With respect
to climate change policy and international efforts
to ‘green’ investment flows towards more
environmentally friendly development projects,
the implications of investment and services
liberalisation are profound. As market-based
schemes such as emissions trading emerge as a
principle component of international climate
change policy, the rules governing its use will
have to coexist with rules governing trade and
investment. Increasingly, these rules continue to
develop and expand in scope and power affecting
more and more aspects of human activity as well
as to influence the shape and direction of
government policy. Any efforts to improve the
laws governing emissions trading or to curb its
use in favour of direct regulation, will be forced
to contend with these wider forces. 
part 5
when worlds collide: trade and environment
“Global capital invents new values in
environmental services. So in this new world
order, development and conservation are
becoming synonymous. And they are basically
geared towards a similar goal, that is 'disguised
profit'. But profit nonetheless.”
Soumitra Ghosh, forest and climate activist
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Attempts in the past to liberalise global
investment rules, such as through the ill-fated
efforts to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) in the OECD, have been met
with exuberant support from the world's
corporate lobby groups and fierce resistance from
civil society and many governments wary of the
dramatic implications.2 Despite numerous
setbacks since the early 1990s when a
comprehensive treaty to liberalise investment
rules was first tabled at the WTO,3 investment
has continued to be on the agenda of the G8,
usually referred to as the ‘Quad’ group of
countries (EU, US, Japan, Canada). 
In the absence of a WTO agreement on
investment, countries have instituted a vast array
of liberalisation programmes across the world.
These rules include approximately 2,300 bilateral
investment treaties and a similar number of so-
called 'double-taxation treaties' and other
international investment agreements. Various
investment-related provisions exist in free trade
agreements such as within the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU’s
Common Market, and the rules embodied in the
WTO system itself.4 According to the UN, in 2004
there were 220 changes to laws worldwide
affecting foreign direct investment “in the
direction of more liberalisation.”5 
Despite the perception of stalled ‘progress’ in
talks at the WTO level, countries across the globe
have been busy tying themselves to a dizzying
panoply of bilateral and multilateral ‘lock-in’
agreements that are designed to remove barriers
to the free flow of capital. In 2004, there were
on average two bilateral investment liberalisation
agreements signed every week and the trend
continues.6 The furious pace of liberalisation in
the realm of investment prompted Karl P Sauvant,
of the UN Conference on Trade and Development
to speculate that, “it may well be that, as the
second half of the 20th century was characterized
by the establishment of an international trade
law system, the first half of the 21st century may
be characterized by the establishment of an
international investment law system.”7 Market-
based mechanisms in environmental agreements
such as Kyoto take place in the context of these
immense liberalising forces. This can undermine
any regulatory safeguards government and NGOs
attempt to put in place as trends move towards
less intervention, not more.
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In climate policy circles there is overwhelming
support for encouraging ‘green investment’ flows
to finance development. The flexible mechanisms
of the Kyoto Protocol have emerged as the main
vehicle to facilitate such capital flows with the
added promise that the resultant ‘technology
transfer’ would enable the Majority World to
‘leapfrog’ dirty industrialisation. By offering the
prize of tradable carbon credits, some hope that
companies will base more of their investment
decisions on their emissions footprint. The Kyoto
Protocol seeks to achieve this by targeting both
project-based Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as
well as pure capital flows (portfolio investment). 
But talk of ‘greening’ investment belies a
disturbing naiveté about the nature of the global
economic system. For example, the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
reports that of all the Foreign Direct Investment
flows to the Majority World, an average of 70%
has been in the form of mergers, takeovers and
acquisitions of Southern companies by Northern
transnationals.8 Consolidation of corporate power
through increased investment liberalisation pose
serious obstacles to encouraging any hope of
market transformation. 
Despite some unique characteristics, carbon
capital must still abide by the rules governing
cross-border investment and economic activity.
This layer-cake of liberalisation prescribes what
governments can do when it comes to controlling
corporate investments in their country. Such
agreements often codify a list of ‘rights’ on the
part of the investor (corporation) and a list of
‘responsibilities’ on the part of the host (host-
country government). 
Investment decisions can have profound impacts
on the local economy as evidenced by recent
popular protests in Bolivia, in which people have
been demanding control over their country's gas
reserves and a share of the benefits (Bolivia has
the second largest gas reserves on the continent).
The people have also been protesting the
presence of predatory ‘investors’ such as
Petrobras, BP, and Repsol encouraged to exploit
the country's resources through World Bank and
IMF strictures with the aim of exporting gas
through Chile and on to the US. Seemingly
‘benign’ investment decisions ultimately sparked
a revolution in the country, with the full
narrative still unfolding. 
Increasingly, many investment treaties also
specify a set of actions a corporate investor can
take against a government that might ‘infringe’
upon its rights such as ‘investor-state’ provisions
whereby a corporation can directly sue a
government for any perceived violation of its
‘rights’ using international courts such as the
World Bank International Court for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID).9 With an arsenal
of legal and technocratic expertise, large
transnational corporations are well placed to
benefit from such provisions, allowing them to
use legal threats to impose a ‘chill effect’ on
governments seeking to exert control over their
activities. 
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the right climate for investment
In parallel to the drive for greater investment
liberalisation, governments are also currently
involved in negotiations to expand the scope of
the World Trade Organisation’s remit in the area
of ‘services’. The General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) is one of the core trade
agreements of the WTO and is broadly concerned
with 'freeing' trade in services (such as tourism
and finance) rather than goods (widgets and
maize). The GATS agreement requires that
governments explore ways to further liberalise
trade in the services sector through a successive
series of mandated negotiations. This state of
‘permanent negotiations’ is intended to ensure
that WTO members continuously expand the
agreement to cover new sectors and promote
further liberalisation and harmonisation of rules
governing trade in all manner of services. Due to
political disputes over issues such as agriculture
following the collapsed of talks in Seattle and
Cancun, the services agenda has been subsumed
into a package of negotiations which has
controversially come to be known as the ‘Doha
Development Agenda’ after the WTO Ministerial
Conference at Doha, Qatar in 2002. 
The expansion of the WTO's remit to include
services represents a dramatic increase in the
trade body’s policing of the rules and functions of
the global economy. According to the WTO,
“services represent the fastest growing sector of
the global economy and account for 60% of global
output, 30% of global employment and nearly 20%
of global trade.”10 Under the WTO, the definition
of 'services' includes sensitive areas such as
public health and social services, education,
water provision, communications, and energy. It
also includes so-called 'environmental services'
such as waste management and pollution control. 
Liberalisation commitments under GATS are
‘bound’ and ‘negotiated’. Once a government
agrees to open up a service sector to
international competition (for example allowing
foreign companies to provide energy) it can only
be closed off again after explicit agreement of all
the countries potentially affected by the change.
According to the WTO, reversing any liberalisation
commitment (‘unbinding’ in WTO-speak) is
extremely difficult as “the commitments are
virtually guaranteed conditions for foreign
exporters and importers of services and investors
in the sector to do business.”11 GATS therefore
offers a very strong guarantee of market access
which can often have unpredictable
consequences. 
When a government finds that it has
unintentionally committed itself to offering
market access in a particular sector, it may
discover that it is virtually impossible to
withdraw. When officials declare an intention to
restrict market access to a liberalised sector, the
threat of trade sanctions can be a powerfully
immobilising force. As the Kyoto Protocol begins
to take-off and future rounds of negotiations
begin to involve commitments by Southern
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are you being served?: the potential impacts of GATS
countries, the question of market access may
figure even higher on the agenda. Northern
corporations and specialist firms such as
emissions brokers and consultants may look South
for expanding their investments in ‘environmental
services’. GATS commitments in the sector may
help ease their way. 
The allure of ‘clean investment’ is being used to
boost the services liberalisation agenda. As Pascal
Kerneis, Managing Director of the corporate lobby
group European Service Forum (ESF) explains, “it
seems to me obvious that developing countries
should indeed favour investment in this area
[environmental services] that is indeed linked to
the Kyoto mechanisms… Industrialised countries
companies will be interested to invest in the
countries where there is a clear and secure legal
environment, and where they can insure a follow-
up of their investment by being allowed to supply
a proper service to the investment in a ‘clean
project’… Therefore, I believe that developing
countries should be encouraged to look at the
synergy between the two issues, given the link
between CDM-related investments and GATS
commitments.”12
The environmental services agenda within the
WTO is becoming a prime driver of trade-climate
interaction. For example, as early as 2003, the US
Government, despite having not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol, submitted detailed proposals in the
WTO’s Doha round of negotiations on GATS which
included liberalisation commitments for the “air
quality and climate services sub-sector”.13
Similarly, negotiations in financial and energy
services will have dramatic impact on the ability
of governments to restrain the activities of
carbon hedge funds and oil companies
respectively as governments commit to greater
market access in these sectors.  
The difference between the services and
investment agenda with the context of climate
policy and their effects has to do with the nature
of the markets. When companies invest in a
project directly with the express aim of
generating carbon credits, most of that
transaction can be said to fall under the rubric of
traditional foreign direct investment and its
attendant infrastructure. But if the market shifts
towards a services-oriented one in which
companies buy, say a ‘climate mitigation service’
from a provider, then it could eventually fall
within the GATS domain. In this context, GATS,
and more generally, the complex web of treaties
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operating at the international level that liberalise
(and protect) foreign investment flows, further
undermines the already questionable sustainable
development benefits of the Kyoto instruments
such as the Clean Development Mechanism. 
From the perspective of decision-makers and
policy analysts, there is very little difference
between traditional forms of investment and the
market-based mechanisms of the climate regime.
“CDM is important for us not only because we
think we can get investment, but also because it
provides a good example of how the environment
and business can go together”, explains Nazareno
Castillo, Clean Development Mechanism co-
ordinator for the Argentine Ministry of
Environment.14
Efforts to rationalise ‘ecosystem services’ in
terms of their economic value, as the UN
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment's has, should
also be met with extreme caution.15 The ongoing
development of international markets in
ecosystem services will not be exempt from WTO
scrutiny, and may one day ultimately fall under
GATS disciplines, extending the competency of
the WTO even further, while posing great risks to
the 'sustainability' aims of these markets. Moves
to further liberalise markets in water are already
underway,16 bringing the prospect of liberalised
carbon markets into the realm of possibility. The
introduction of emissions trading schemes with
their requisite assumption of property rights
paves the way for such possibilities to manifest.
Groups such as the UN-backed International
Emissions Trading Association and the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development
have long been proponents of “free trade in
greenhouse gases”.17 The crowbar of liberalisation
as enshrined in a multitude of overlapping
bilateral and multilateral trade and investment
agreements can be a convenient tool in advancing
this cause. 
a rose by any other NAMA
As if to net any remaining areas of economic
activity, current WTO negotiations in the so-
called Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations
threaten to confine government's ability to
regulate the market even further. The wide-
ranging negotiations target such things as eco-
labelling and certification schemes (which raises
doubts over the viability of initiatives such as the
WWF’s ‘Gold Standard’ certification for CDM
projects), ‘environmental goods’ (such as
pollution control equipment) and environmental
standards. Friends of the Earth’s Tony Juniper and
Ronnie Hall warn that ‘trade-offs’ in these
negotiations could spell disaster for the
environment. “There is a real possibility, too,
that negotiators will seek to trade reductions in
environmental standards in Europe, and other
industrialised countries, for corporate access to
ever more and cheaper natural resources in
developing countries.”18
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The overwhelming majority of existing trade-
environment discourse has tended to be based on
the assumption that trade liberalisation and
sustainable development are mutually reinforcing.
This is reflected in the treaties themselves. For
example, the Kyoto Protocol’s Article 2.3 commits
parties to, “strive to implement policies and
measures... in such a way as to minimise adverse
effects, including the adverse effects of climate
change, effects on international trade, and
social, environmental and economic impacts on
other Parties.”19 Article 3.5 of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change commits
signatories to the principle that “parties should
cooperate to promote an... open international
economic system” and ensure that “measures
taken to combat climate change, including
unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.”20
Some WTO agreements in turn refer to the
importance of sustainable development and
environmental protection. A WTO communiqué
released at the launch of the Doha negotiations
declared: “The aims of upholding and
safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory
multilateral trading system, and acting for the
protection of the environment and the promotion
of sustainable development can and must be
mutually supportive.”21 It is important to note,
however, that while the references to trade in
the climate treaties are embedded within the
core of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol, the WTO language
on sustainable development and environmental
protection remains largely in non-binding
communiqués and preambles which is an
important legal distinction. Nonetheless, the
prevailing institutional opinion is fairly clear on
this point - trade liberalisation in most respects
is synonymous with ‘sustainable development’.
The existence of reassuring language in what are
essentially the constitutions for the global
economy and global efforts to combat climate
change respectively, has placated many
analysts.22 But this optimistic outlook has been
very narrowly focused around technical details
rather than wider analysis of competing
influences. This lack of deeper consideration of
the various forces affecting environmental policy
represents a dangerous underestimation of the
conflicts. In the final analysis, the quest for
‘mutually supportive frameworks’, represents the
primacy of neoliberal dogma in the trade-
environment discourse. 
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the feeling’s mutual: climate and commerce
The success of this new discourse can be
measured in the rapid development of new
markets in ‘ecosystems services’ and ever more
elaborate pollution trading schemes. Preference
for these models is increasingly evident in policy
circles and is becoming the default position when
approaching environmental issues in many
countries. In the UK and US this trend is
especially dominant. However countries such as
the Netherlands, China, India, Australia and New
Zealand are also experimenting with
‘environmental markets’ as well as many other
countries where free market environmentalist
discourse is gaining traction. Here we present a
few notable developments. 
Mercury is a toxic substance that at high levels
may damage the brain, kidneys, and foetal
development. The US National Research Council
estimates that 60,000 children are born each year
at risk of adverse neuro-developmental effects
due to exposure to mercury in the womb.1
Mercury does occur naturally but among
anthropogenic sources, coal-fired power plants
account for over 40% of emissions in the US.2
Therefore the focus of legislation has been upon
reducing emissions from industrial sources.
However, George W. Bush’s Clear Skies package
has taken a more business-friendly approach by
allowing industry to trade in emissions of the
pollutant. 
The first mercury trading system in the world,
Bush claims it will achieve a 70% reduction in
mercury emissions. However the Sierra Club
estimate that by the fifteenth year of the plan,
“9.5 more tons of mercury would be allowed than
under strong enforcement of existing Clean Air
Act programs.”3 Critics go further saying that the
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
stated that 90% reductions are possible using
existing technologies, therefore trading is an
unnecessary system. 
Further problems arise when a system allowing
varying levels of pollution around different plants
is allowed. Communities most at risk are those
living near coal-fired power plants as mercury is
produced in these processes and finds its way into
the air and water directly around the plants.
Under a trading system individual plants are able
to buy credits from other facilities, therefore
local people around poor performing facilities
continue to be exposed to high risk. Linked to
this phenomenon are environmental justice
free-market environmentalism gains new ground
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impacts whereby indigenous communities in the
US claim to suffer disproportionately from
mercury poisoning of rivers as their livelihoods
depend on fishing and hunting.
oil pollution trading
Oil discharge is created from the extraction
process as seawater is pumped into oil deposits in
order to push the oil to the surface. The water,
which contains residual oil and other organic
compounds, is then either dumped at sea or
injected back into the empty oil deposit.
Currently Britain is the largest source of oil
discharge in the North Sea with 5,500 tonnes
dumped each year. In order to tackle this type of
pollution, the OSPAR Convention was set up in
1992 to protect the marine environment of the
north-east Atlantic, setting a target of reducing
oil discharge by 15% by the end of 2006.4 In
response to OSPAR, the UK government, together
with offshore operators, have devised the first
tradable permits scheme for oil discharge. The
trading scheme is due to begin in January 2006,
covering 44 off-shore oil field operators in the
North Sea and north-east Atlantic. 
Independent analysis of the scheme is scarce and
there has been no public discussion on the policy,
with the UK's Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) stating that little would be added by a
debate and there was in fact “no overriding legal
requirement” for public consultation.5 However
environmental groups active on marine protection
have voiced frustration about the plans. Simon
Walmsby from WWF UK stated, “The scheme
doesn’t have environmental criteria to account
for sensitive areas. So it means that an oil
platform in a less sensitive ecological area can
sell credits to an operation in an extremely
sensitive area and continue to do harm.”6 His
concerns are echoed in the original OSPAR
agreement where it states that “no individual
offshore installation should exceed a
performance standard for dispersed oil of 30 mg/l
for produced water discharged into the sea.”
[emphasis added] However, under the British
trading scheme, installations can exceed those
limits and simply purchase the permits they need
to fulfil their obligations, in direct contradiction
with the international agreement. 
The DTI have been accused by commentators of
being a ‘soft touch’ when dealing with the oil and
gas industry on pollution issues. Walmsby would
agree stating that “There's a conflict of interest
with the DTI sponsoring and regulating industry.”
Although standards in Europe are high,
enforcement is problematic and there is over-
reliance on self-reporting. This becomes clear by
there having been only two prosecutions for
spillages in the past thirty years. The lack of
political will for systematic monitoring and
unannounced inspections seems to have evolved
further in a whole-scale shift from, albeit weak,
government regulation to a trading scheme
managed and monitored by the polluters. Walmsby
concludes that “from a cynical perspective
[trading means] industry just don't have to make
any cuts.”  Other large polluters such as Norway
have taken a different approach. Utilising
traditional command-and-control methods, they
claim they will achieve zero emissions by the end
of 2005. 
wetlands banking
As part of the Clean Water Act in the US,
developers are required to obtain permits to build
on wetlands. The permit requires the developer
to create wetlands elsewhere to ‘compensate’ for
the loss of the habitat destroyed in the course of
the construction. Gradually this system has
evolved into a trading scheme whereby private
wetlands ‘banks’ are now created to sell credits
to developers. There is no national data from the
US evaluating these schemes, particularly as State
and federal regulatory processes can create
diverse sets of results from place to place.
However, some observations can be made from
the existing body of data available. 
The State of Indiana has seen 87% of its wetlands
destroyed since pre-settlement times. Wetlands
are crucial for flood control, water filtration and
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contain enormous biodiversity, therefore impacts
from the destruction of these ecosystems can be
far-reaching. Since the Clean Water Act in the
early 70s, the State has also seen the gradual
deregulation of protection for wetlands. In 2003 a
new law was pushed through the State apparatus
to redefine the classifications of wetlands. This
law will now allow thousands of acres of natural
wetlands to be destroyed as many types of
wetlands are excluded from the classifications.
Further, the new laws mean that many wetlands
are left unprotected as even those included can
be destroyed provided developers create
compensatory wetlands.7
In California, University of California Los Angeles
(UCLA) researchers conducted a study on the
quality of created wetlands under the
compensatory system from 1991-2002. They found
that up to 58% of created wetlands were failed to
qualify as functional replacements for natural
wetlands. Only 4% were considered optimal
wetlands.8 The assumption that created wetlands
are equal to natural ones turns out to be false.
However these mitigation schemes exist in
parallel to trends to undermine existing
legislation. Differential impacts are also evident
as more habitats are targeted by developers in
urban areas than in rural areas. Therefore urban
environments become more vulnerable to the
impacts of wetlands degradation, such as risks of
floods and groundwater loss. Additionally even if
all replacement wetlands were optimal, there is
often a six year time difference between the
destruction of a habitat and the creation of the
mitigation project. As Bowden Quinn from the
Sierra Club in Indiana sums up, “the best
approach is still to avoid destroying wetlands
whenever possible, and we aren't doing that
nearly enough.”9
landfill trading
First proposed by the UK government in 1999, the
Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) began in
April 2005, the first of its kind in the world.
Covering local authorities responsible for landfill
disposal but not commercial users, the scheme is
the Government's response to targets set by the
EU Landfill Directive. Each authority has received
a quota of allowances that enable it to dump at
landfill sites. If it exceeds its quota then the
authority has to seek credits from other
authorities or pay a fine. 
However critics state that the trading scheme is
set to provide incentives for major capital
projects as solutions to reducing landfill, such as
incineration and mechanical and biological
treatment. As targets loom and credits in the
scheme do not discriminate on environmental or
social impacts, authorities will be forced to opt
for these 'quick fixes' over recycling or waste
prevention. Additional environmental justice
impacts appear as incineration becomes the
solution of choice for local authorities. Friends of
the Earth found that 50% of incinerators were in
the poorest 10% of UK wards, highlighting the
unseen side effects of blunt economic instruments
such as trading.10 
Many authorities are unhappy with the scheme
and the Local Government Association (LGA) state
those struggling need more funding and not
penalisation. They predict that most authorities
will not be able to meet their 2020 targets and
the trading scheme will not be able to provide
enough credits to aid those with problems. The
LGA claim that authorities face up to £13 million
in fines and that these losses will have to be paid
from increases in council taxes.11 Despite dissent
from local authorities and criticism from
environmental groups, the Government's obsession
with trading schemes remains relentless. As Julian
Rose from Environmental Data Services puts it:
“Normally with these issues, there would be a big
debate and politicians would have to make
unpopular decisions. The beauty of LATS is that
no-one has to make a decision at all and they can
just leave it up to the market.”12
There are also many other schemes being
developed or under way including: tradable
permits in recycling, endangered species trading,
personal carbon credit cards, water pollution
trading and many others. The relentless
proliferation of these schemes in the area of
environmental protection is set to accelerate as
parallel trends in international economics veer
towards deregulation and voluntary agreements.
This is just the beginning. 
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likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
The collapse of the Russian economy
in the 1990s means that it is
guaranteed that it will meet its
Kyoto targets .
emissions trading
Unsurprisingly, Russia has been one
of the most enthusiastic proponents
of emissions trading as it stands to
benefit the most from any
international scheme that would
allow other countries to buy its many
emissions permits resulting from its
massive contraction in the economy
since 1990. It expects to recieve
even more permits as a result of its
massive forest cover. When the US
pulled out of Kyoto, the Russian
Government was quite concerned
that it had lost the largest potential
purchaser for its emissions permits.
In the meantime, Russia continues to
look to Annex 1 countries who are
likely to buy its permits to meet
their Kyoto obligations. 
energy subsidies
Precise information on subsidies for
the energy sector in Russia were
unavailable. Given that all of the
major fossil fuel companies are still
in state hands (i.e. RosUgol, the
largest coal producer in Russia and
the recently renationalised Yukos),
substantial public dollars are being
spent on dirty forms of energy.
Moreover, Russia uses almost no
renewable energy.
relevant facts
In 2004, Russia's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) grew by approximately
7.1%, surpassing average growth
rates in all other G8 countries, and
marking the country's sixth
consecutive year of economic
expansion. Russia's economic growth
over the last five years has been
fuelled primarily by energy exports,
particularly given the boom in
Russian oil production and relatively
high world oil prices.
country profile: russia
Figure 14  Source: International Energy Agency
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country profile: usa
likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
With George W Bush in the White House until
2008, the US shows no signs of ratifying the
Protocol or of meeting its original target of
reducing its emissions by 7% of 1990 levels by
2012. However a number of emissions-reduction
programmes are currently in place at the State
Government level in many parts of the country
including renewable energy targets, mandatory
GHG reporting, and public benefit funds. Given
the fact that some individual States emit more
GHGs than some countries (for example, Texas
emits more than France, and California more than
Brazil), these measures implemented at the State
level may have some impact on global emissions as
well as a possible influence in determining
national policy.1
emissions trading
The US was the first country to experiment with
emissions trading as the Environmental Protection
Agency began testing out pilot projects back in the
1970s. In 1990, the US Congress amended the Clean
Air Act to set up a nation-wide emissions trading
system in sulphur dioxide emissions from coal-
fuelled power stations, the main cause of acid rain.
The Climate Stewardship Act was reintroduced to
the House of Congress in February 2005 after
narrowly being rejected in 2003, which proposes to
cut GHG emissions to 2000 levels by 2010, by
introducing a nationwide ‘cap and trade’ system
modelled on the sulphur dioxide emissions market.2
The lack of US Kyoto Protocol ratification means
that for the meantime, the US will not formally be
taking part in the international GHG emissions
market. However several private sector initiatives,
including the Chicago Climate Exchange, are
trading in carbon ‘offset’ credits.
energy subsidies
The central question concerning the United States’
support of the energy sector is not whether it
happens but how to measure it. There is no clear
consensus as to what actually constitutes a subsidy,
with some arguing that part of the astronomical US
defence budget should be included as a subsidy
towards energy security. This explains the variance
in estimates for the size of subsidies, an example
being that of the estimate for subsidies for
exploration, transportation, and production in the
oil sector in 1995, which ranges from $15.7 billion
to $35.2 billion.3 In comparison, the total amount
of money that Congress allocated for renewable
energy research in 2000 was $390 million. In the
last 50 years, nuclear energy subsidies have
totalled close to $145 billion; renewable energy
subsidies total close to $5 billion.4
Figure 15  Source: International Energy Agency
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likelihood of meeting kyoto targets
Germany has one of the most ambitious Kyoto targets,
promising to cut its emissions by 21% of 1990 levels by 2012
and it appears that this target is within its reach. This cut
accounts for almost 3/4 of the EU's total emissions reduction
commitment, but a large part of the dramatic drop in German
emissions during the 1990s was attributable to the immense
economic slump in the Eastern part of the country. This drop
reflects a special, one-off cut that was a by-product of socio-
economic circumstances rather than any conscious effort to
reduce emissions, comparable to the British ‘dash for gas’ and
the collapse of the Russian economy during the 1990s. The
German government made an additional internal target to
reduce its CO2 levels by 25% by 2005 which it seems unlikely
to achieve, given that in 2002 it was still almost 10% short.1
emissions trading
Germany was allocated 1497 millions tonnes of CO2 for the
first period of the EU emissions trading scheme under the
German National Allocation Plan, which accounted for 26.7%
of the total allowances.2 1,849 installations belonging to
around 1,200 energy companies and the energy intensive
industries from Germany are participating in the EU-ETS. The
entire allocation of allowances is free of charge in Germany,
whereas some other Member States are selling or auctioning a
small percentage of their EU allowances. German companies
RWE and Deutsche Bank are investors in the World Bank's
Prototype Carbon Fund.
country profile: germany
Figure 16  Source: International Energy Agency 
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For too long, much of mainstream climate
activism and NGO lobbying efforts have operated
as if climate policy existed in a vacuum. But to
continue to presume so, is a tragic under-
estimation of the various forces that shape
environmental decision-making and their
conflicting motivations and aims. Numerous
factors influence the pitch and timbre of climate
discourse. But amidst the cacophony of
ideological, economic, and political manoeuvring
lies the reality of climate change and the dangers
it poses to people and planet. 
G8 posturing, corporate greenwash, and the
sclerosis of pro-market NGO politics pose
numerous obstacles to effective action on climate
change. The impotence of both the G8
governments and the ‘Green 8’2 big
environmental NGOs to address fundamental
issues of democracy and power within the climate
talks, in the final analysis, contributes to the
relegation of alternatives and the narrowing of
political space that allows them to flourish. The
neoliberal ethic that pervades the climate debate
is neither natural nor self-evident. It is
constructed and replicated by thousands of
multiplying agencies that transport the pollen of
market fundamentalism into the landscape of
environmental discourse.  
The G8 and free-market environmentalists have
been at the forefront of championing a rosy
narrative of ‘win-win’ scenarios where the quest
to maximise corporate profits can be ameliorated
with wider goals of pursuing social and
environmental justice. But the commod-ification
agenda implicit in such a paradigm is deeply
contentious. As Soumitra Ghosh from the National
Forum for Forest Peoples and Forest Workers in
India characterises it, moves to marketise
ecosystem services represents a “very crass, very
gross commercialisation of resources.”3
Free-market environmentalists themselves appear
to be acting more on faith than their ability to
point to demonstrable outcomes. When asked
whether greenhouse gas trading will help solve
climate change, a representative of the UN-
backed corporate lobby group, the International
Emissions Trading Association, recently admitted:
“It's too early to tell, but it has to!”4
Nevertheless, the green evangelism of emissions
brokers and marketeers wins hearts and minds.
conclusion
“What we call Man's [sic] power over
Nature turns out to be a power
excercised by some men over other men
with nature as its instrument.”1
C S Lewis, British author and scholar
image by paul watson
Whereas other forms of market-based approaches
such as taxation sit uncomfortably with
politicians and industry, models such as pollution
trading allow decision-makers to ‘leave it up to
the market’. Meanwhile the opaque and volatile
nature of commercial transactions and an
increasingly lax regulatory culture makes the
pursuit of even the most basic information a
monumental task. Industry self-monitoring,
hamstrung regulatory agencies and a barrage of
public relations noise all help obfuscate the truth
about corporate environmental performance. 
Tacit endorsement of the investment agenda
pervading the climate regime is also a disturbing
trend. Despite the flowery rhetoric of the ‘Doha
Development Agenda’ and the promise of ‘clean
development’, the increasing expansion of
corporate-friendly trade and investment regimes
both in the WTO and through parallel processes,
"threatens to dismantle a wide range of national
laws protecting the environment, social well
being and health," according to campaigners.5
The clamour to break down the barriers to trade
in carbon commodities and services under the
pretence of promoting ‘sustainable development’
is a red herring. In the case of emissions trading
markets, efforts to ‘maximise environmental
gains’ by introducing various forms of
restrictions6 will inevitably bump up against the
unrelenting drive towards 'freeing' the market. In
the context of the Clean Development Mechanism
and the promise of 'leapfrogging industrialisation',
it is important too to recall the failure of
traditional commodity export dependence as
promoted by the G8 to lift countries out of
poverty. 
Carbon commodity fetish represents one of the
greatest threats to averting the climate crisis. As
the signatories to the Durban Declaration on
Carbon Trading attest: “History has seen attempts
to commodify land, food, labour, forests, water,
genes and ideas. Carbon trading follows in the
footsteps of this history and turns the earth's
carbon-cycling capacity into property to be
bought or sold in a global market. Through this
process of creating a new commodity - carbon -
the Earth's ability and capacity to support a
climate conducive to life and human societies is
now passing into the same corporate hands that
are destroying the climate.”7
The waltz of corporate, NGO and government
(mis)steps towards enclosure and commodification
that characterises the state of the official
climate talks is reminiscent of what, in 1982,
radical Austrian-US ecologist and educator Ivan
Illich warned of a coming “oligarchic,
undemocratic and authoritarian expertocracy
governed by ecologists.”8
All these factors and more represent serious
obstacles towards achieving environmental
objectives. Activism on climate change must
begin to grapple with these wider issues, and
promote greater synergies with other important
struggles in the areas of trade, finance, human
rights, environmental justice and democracy, if
an effective challenge to the neoliberal paradigm
is to be mounted. In the interests of broader
ambitions for people and planet, or even the
more specific and urgent need to combat the root
causes of climate change, we simply cannot
afford to do otherwise. 
“History has seen attempts to
commodify land, food, labour,
forests, water, genes and
ideas. Carbon trading follows
in the footsteps of this history
and turns the earth's carbon-
cycling capacity into property
to be bought or sold in a
global market. Through this
process of creating a new
commodity - carbon - the
Earth's ability and capacity to
support a climate conducive to
life and human societies is now
passing into the same
corporate hands that are
destroying the climate.”
Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading
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carbon sequestration
The process by which CO2 is removed from the
atmosphere and  stored in carbon sinks, but also
refers to the process of carbon capture and storage
(see page 19).
carbon 'sink'
A carbon dioxide sink or CO2 'sink' is the opposite of
a carbon source. The main 'sinks' are the oceans and
growing vegetation. The concept has become widely
known through the Kyoto Protocol. The idea is that
growing vegetation absorbs carbon dioxide, so that
countries that have large areas of forest (or other
vegetation) can deduct a certain amount from their
emissions, thus making it easier to achieve the
desired emission levels. However, the effectiveness
of the proposed 'sinks' as well as their impact on
local communities and ecosystems is extremely
controversial.
clean development mechanism (CDM)
The Clean Development Mechanism is one of the
three so-called flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto
Protocol. These mechanisms are designed to make it
easier and cheaper for industrialised countries to
meet the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction
targets that they agreed to under the Protocol. The
CDM is also mandated to "assist developing countries
in achieving sustainable development". What
constitutes sustainable development is decided by
the host party.
Under the CDM, an industrialised country with a GHG
reduction target (an Annex B country) can invest in a
project in a developing country without a target
(non-Annex B), and claim credit for the emissions
that the project achieves. For example, an
industrialised country may invest in a wind power
project in a developing country that replaces
electricity that would otherwise have been produced
from coal. The industrialised country can then claim
credit for the emissions that have been avoided, and
use these credits to meet its own target. For
industrialised countries, this greatly reduces the
cost of meeting the reduction commitments that
they agreed to under the Kyoto Protocol. 
export credit agency (ECA)
ECAs are public financial institutions that help
companies conduct business overseas in developing
countries and emerging markets. ECAs provide
government-backed loans, guarantees and insurance
to corporations in the home ECA country.
european union emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS)
See page 10
glossary
greenwash
Greenwash (a word created  from green and
whitewash) is a term that environmentalists and
other critics give to the process of presenting a
positive public image for environmentally unsound
practices. The term arose in the aftermath of the
Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.
Corporate lobby groups saw the Earth Summit as a
prominent platform from which to redefine their
role and to shape the emerging debate on
environment and sustainable development.
international monetary fund (IMF)
The IMF is the international organization responsible
for managing the global financial system and for
providing loans to its member states to help
alleviate balance of payments problems. Part of its
mission is to provide assistance to countries that
experience serious economic difficulties. In return,
the countries are obliged to launch certain reforms
such as Structural Adjustment Programmes.
joint implementation (JI)
One of the three market mechanisms established by
the Kyoto Protocol, whereby an industrialised
country can receive 'emissions reductions units'
when it helps to finance projects that reduce
emissions in another industrialised country
(including countries with economies in transition).
liberalisation
Liberalisation is a political philosophy that supports
a reduced government role in the economy. It
believes that markets should, as far as possible, be
left to the forces of supply and demand.
national allocation plan (NAP)
A national plan for each Member State of the EU
that outlines the total quantity of carbon dioxide
emission allowances that it intends to allocate for
that period and how it proposes to allocate them
under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(see page 10) 
neoliberalism
Neoliberalism is an economic philosophy that de-
emphasises the role of government in managing the
economy (or the climate for that matter) in favour
of the market and the private sector. It
encompasses the basic elements of classical free
market theory but extends further into areas such
as its promotion and protection of intellectual
property rights and enclosure, unbridled corporate
power, and its reliance upon strong supra-national
institutions to 'govern' the global economy such as
the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, various UN
agencies and the G8.
neo-Malthusianism
Neo-Malthusianism is a set of doctrines which have
their precedent with Thomas Malthus's concept of
limited resources keep populations in check and
reduce economic growth. (see footnote 19 on page
60)
organization for economic cooperation and
development (OECD)
The OECD is an international agency which supports
programs designed to facilitate trade and
‘development’. 
regulation
In the context of government and public services
regulation (as a process) is the control of something
by rules, as opposed to its prohibition. In
economics, it is part of the government relationship
with markets, often seen as the opposite of
deregulation.
world bank
Officially the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the World Bank is an international
organisation established in 1945 that assists
governments around the world in economic
development efforts.
world bank prototype carbon fund (PCF)
See page 25
world trade organisation (WTO)
The World Trade Organisation is an international
organisation formed to develop and enforce
worldwide rules to promote international trade,
including lowering tariffs and removing national
trade barriers that restrict imports or exports of
goods and services.
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This briefing examines the
relationship between free-market
economic forces and climate change
policy while scrutinising the rhetoric
and reality behind promises on
climate made by the most powerful
politicians in the world – the G8. It
also explores the origins of free-
market environmentalism and analyses
the conflicts and synergies that arise
when the worlds of trade and
environment collide.
For too long, much of mainstream
climate activism and NGO lobbying
efforts have operated as if climate
policy existed in a vacuum. Activism
on climate change must begin to
grapple with these wider issues, and
promote greater engagement with
other important struggles in the areas
of trade, finance, human rights,
environmental justice and democracy,
if an effective challenge to the
neoliberal paradigm is to be mounted.
In the interests of broader ambitions
for people and planet and the urgent
need to combat the root causes of
climate change, we simply cannot
afford to do otherwise. 
“What we call Man's [sic] power over
Nature turns out to be a power
exercised by some men over other men
with nature as its instrument.”
C S Lewis, British author and scholar
(1898-1963)
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